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Abstract
We are progressing toward a post-antibiotic world: Antibiotic drugs that could once
treat basic infections are losing their effectiveness at an accelerating rate. If this
trend continues, common illnesses will become potentially deadly, and more complex
procedures—chemotherapy, surgeries, dialysis—will carry much more significant risk.
The modern industrial agricultural system may have contributed significantly to this
state of affairs. The vast majority of antibiotics sold in the United States each year—
an estimated 70 to 80 percent—are for use in animal agriculture. These antibiotics
are primarily administered to food-producing animals at routine, low doses as a cheap
method of promoting faster growth and preventing disease in crowded, unsanitary
conditions. These subtherapeutic doses, however, are also the most conducive to breeding
antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The resistant bacteria bred in animals are then transferred
to humans through a variety of mechanisms and reduce the efficacy of antibiotic drugs.
In order to address the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in humans, it is crucial
to reduce the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals. How to
efficiently and cost effectively reduce their use, however, remains unclear, and is not a
problem traditional command-and-control legislation can solve.
Democratic experimentalist theory offers a compelling framework for addressing this
problem. Under the traditional democratic experimentalist model, a central institution
sets a common goal and then delegates authority to local institutions to experiment
to achieve that goal. Local institutions then provide data on their performance to
the central institution to pool, assess, and re-benchmark. The federal government has
identified the importance of reducing antibiotic use in livestock, but beyond articulating
this goal, has failed to act thus far. In its place, California has become the first state to
pass a law banning the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals. This
legislation is an exemplar of state action with the potential to improve the food system
and public health both locally and in other states, and it could do so effectively using a
new, layered iteration of democratic experimentalism.
The California law is, however, subject to legal challenge under federal preemption
grounds. This Article analyzes these grounds and concludes that the law may survive such
a challenge because it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported
by California’s compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
The Article further contends that democratic experimentalist theory also bolsters the
argument against federal preemption here and more generally when addressing these
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types of knowledge-intensive, scientifically uncertain policy areas where experimentation
is key to problem-solving and especially where there is a threat to public health. As the
only state action in this critical area, ensuring the experimentalist implementation of
the California law and securing its fate against preemption are crucial to addressing the
threat to public health posed by antibiotic resistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Antibiotics, also known as antimicrobials,1 are critical to modern medicine.
However, these drugs are losing their effectiveness at an accelerating rate.2 If
this trend continues unabated, we will lose the ability to treat even the most
basic infections as we rapidly progress toward a post-antibiotic world. Common, everyday illnesses will become potentially deadly, and more complex
procedures—chemotherapy, surgeries, dialysis—will carry untenable risk.
This phenomenon has already placed serious burdens on our healthcare system
and economy, and future forecasts are even more alarming.
How did we reach this state of affairs? The modern industrial agricultural
system may have contributed significantly. The vast majority of antibiotics sold
in the United States each year—an estimated 70 to 80 percent—are for use in animal agriculture.3 Although the presence of some antibiotic resistance is scientifically inevitable, the overuse and misuse of antibiotics accelerates the prevalence of
these resistant bacteria. The antibiotics are primarily administered to foodproducing animals at routine, low doses as a cheap method of promoting faster
growth and preventing disease in crowded, unsanitary conditions. Incidentally,
however, these subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics are the most conducive to
breeding antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The resistant bacteria bred in animals then
get transferred to humans through various mechanisms, which reduces the efficacy of antibiotic drugs in humans. This serious threat has been well recognized for
decades—both by the medical community and the federal government.4 In order
1.
2.
3.

4.

This Article uses the terms “antibiotic” and “antimicrobial” synonymously, though by strict
definition the two are not identical. All antibiotics are antimicrobials, but not all antimicrobials are
antibiotics.
CDC, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013), http://
www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WKR-SPZ6]
[hereinafter ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US].
Joan A. Casey et al., High-Density Livestock Operations, Crop Field Application of Manure, and Risk
of Community-Associated Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus Infection in Pennsylvania, 173
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1980, 1980 (2013), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article
.aspx?articleid=1738717 [https://perma.cc/Y5UF-TL43]; Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the
FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1010–12 (2013);
JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION
IN AMERICA: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE PEW COMMISSION’S PRIORITY
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2013), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johnshopkins-center-for-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/CLF-PEW-for%20Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST97-JHH2] [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION].
See FDA, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BY
THE FDA TASK FORCE IN THE USE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN ANIMAL FEEDS 3, 10 (1972),
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924051104002 [https://perma.cc/6VZG-RLQ2].
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to address the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in humans, it is crucial
to reduce the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.
Resistant strains continue to multiply, with two million illnesses and 23,000
deaths each year attributed to antibiotic-resistant infections.5 Even so, and despite recognizing the threat, the federal government has been slow to act, and the
action that it has taken has been ineffectual. For nearly forty years, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has failed to follow through on its 1970s threat
to withdraw approval for subtherapeutic use of antibiotics.6 For fifteen years, federal legislation that would prohibit the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics has languished in Congress.7
Some states have attempted to address the problem with their own legislation. To date, only one has succeeded. In October 2015, California passed the
first and only state law prohibiting the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in foodproducing animals, both for growth promotion and disease prevention purposes.8
The law, which will take effect in January 2018, represents an important step
forward in the effort to reduce the problematic use of antibiotics.9 In addition to
banning both subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics, the California law also requires,
for the first time, data collection on antibiotic use in livestock.10 The FDA currently does not track the use of antibiotics in livestock or require any data collection, making it difficult to fully understand the extent of the threat of the
agricultural use of antibiotics.11 Scientists’ uncertainty over the extent to which
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 11 (“Each year in the United
States, at least 2 million people acquire serious infections with bacteria that are resistant to one or
more of the antibiotics designed to treat those infections. At least 23,000 people die each year as a
direct result of these antibiotic-resistant infections. Many more die from other conditions that
were complicated by an antibiotic-resistant infection.”).
Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 9,811, 9,813 (Apr. 20,
1973) (codified at former 21 C.F.R. § 135.109; renumbered at 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013));
Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. at 43,772 (Aug. 30,
1977); Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes: Opportunity
for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977); Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds,
Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,827–28 (Nov. 17, 1978). See generally Diana R.H. Winters,
Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J. 1047
(2015).
Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2015, H.R. 1552, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1552/text [https://perma.cc/ZQ3J-TZ4A].
S.B. 27 Livestock: Use of Antimicrobial Drugs (Cal. 2015), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB27 [https://perma.cc/X92W-R5RW].
Id.
Id.
Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–
14, 127 Stat. 451 (2013). See generally Qiuzhi Chang et al., Antibiotics in Agriculture and the Risk to
Human Health: How Worried Should We Be?, 8 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 240 (2015)
(showing the lack of measures requiring data collection or tracking antibiotic use by the FDA).
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agricultural antibiotic use accelerates human antibiotic resistance is due in large
part to a lack of data. The data collection requirement in the California law
aims to fill this large information gap and will help scientists, and ultimately
policymakers, better understand the effects of agricultural antibiotic use on
antibiotic resistance in humans.
Because this lack of data obscures how to efficiently and effectively reduce
the overuse of antibiotics in livestock, this problem is not one for traditional
command-and-control legislation to solve. Command-and-control legislation is
direct regulation that clearly states what is and is not legal. Because this type of
legislation makes unequivocal prescriptions, it functions well when it is clear how
to solve a problem legislatively, but does not in cases like this where the right legislative answer is uncertain. Democratic experimentalist theory, however, offers
a compelling framework for addressing this problem. Under the traditional
democratic experimentalist model, a central institution sets a common goal and
then delegates authority to experiment to achieve that goal to local institutions,
which provide data on their performance to the central institution to pool and
compare. The central institution assesses local performances and re-benchmarks
new goals accordingly.
The federal government has identified the importance of reducing antibiotic use in livestock, but beyond this centralized goal setting, has failed to act.
With the federal government having thus far neglected to address the problem of
antibiotic resistance in agriculture, this Article proposes that states are uniquely
positioned to fill the void in information and to provide potential solutions. California, for example, should implement its law to delegate authority to production
firms to experiment with the best mechanisms to efficiently reduce antibiotic use
in livestock. It should do so by collecting robust data from these firms on their
approaches, pooling and comparing that data, and then benchmarking firms to
improve the worst performers, and perhaps reward the best performers. What
would then emerge is a new iteration of democratic experimentalism—what I
term layered democratic experimentalism—that could offer great promise as a
hybrid public-private mechanism for policymaking and problem-solving. In this
layered democratic experimentalist approach, the federal government identifies
a goal, and state governments enact an initial benchmark, serve as data collectors and poolers, and delegate authority to local firms to experiment to achieve
the overarching goal. As more states enact antibiotics laws, there can also be
state-level comparisons of best legislative practices to reduce antibiotic use in
agriculture.
If implemented strategically and robustly and under this layered democratic
experimentalist framework, California’s law has groundbreaking potential. In
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particular, if California effectively implements its data collection requirements,
the state would become an epicenter for determining the leading mechanisms to
reduce the use of antibiotics in livestock, leading the nation in this scientific and
business management inquiry and also testing the contours and effectiveness of
layered democratic experimentalism. California’s potential to be a trailblazer in
this area is particularly important given that California is a large and influential
state and also a significant producer of meat.12 California has the most agriculture sales of any state, accounting for nearly 11 percent of the U.S. total and has
the third largest livestock industry in the country.13 California has a unique opportunity to lead the way with groundbreaking experimentation, but it can only
do so if the data collection component of the law is implemented well. Ensuring
strategic and robust data collection will be critical to the law’s success in problemsolving this threat to public health.
Although the arguments against preemption are strong, the California law
may face legal challenge on preemption grounds. Because the federal and state
governments have concurrent and often overlapping authority in food legislation, where federal authority ends and state authority begins is often a hazy
line.14 Although a state has the power to legislate to protect the health and safety
of its citizens, it can only do so to the extent the state law does not conflict with
federal law, whether directly or indirectly.15 It is also often unclear when certain actions by the federal government, including the FDA, constitute “federal
law” for the purposes of preemption.16 The California law should survive a
preemption challenge despite deliberately exceeding the federal scheme because
it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported by California’s compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, but a
court could plausibly find either way on this issue. This Article argues that democratic experimentalism can, however, bolster the argument against preemption.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

CAL. DEPT. OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE STATISTICS REVIEW, 88–98
(2015), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2015Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7FZ8ADS].
USDA, 2012 Census Highlights, CENSUS OF AGRIC. (May 2014), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/
Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farm_Economics [https://perma.cc/8WA7UBHA].
For example, the federal government has exclusive authority in food labeling, though states may
have some authority to legislate in this area as well, as indicated by the controversy generated by the
Vermont Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) labeling law. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012); 9
VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043 (2016); Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State
Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2014).
See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009); Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d
237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Democratic experimentalism should inform preemption doctrine when the policy area at hand is knowledge-intensive and involves scientific uncertainty, where
experimentation is key to problem-solving, and especially where there is a threat
to public health. Animated by the potential fruits of experimentalism, preemption doctrine in this context should evolve to favor the democratic experimentalist
approach.
As the only state action in this critical area, ensuring the experimentalist
implementation of the California law and securing its fate against preemption are
crucial to addressing the threat that overuse of antibiotics poses to public health. A
democratic experimentalist–infused preemption doctrine thus becomes critical to
public health and safety. How the law is implemented, particularly from a data
collection perspective, and whether it is preempted could significantly impact the
advancement of scientific knowledge in this area and the state of human health in
the decades to come. It could also have considerable effects on states’ abilities to
address the critical problem of antibiotic resistance in humans and other similar issues as they emerge. Finally, the successes or failures of the California law can help
provide practical guidance to other states on best practices in legislating in this area.
Part I of this paper provides background on the history of antibiotics and
elucidates the threat of antibiotic resistance. Part II introduces democratic experimentalism and presents it as a theoretical lens to inform the problem-solving
process for reducing the overuse of antibiotics in food-producing animals. Part
III gives the history of federal regulation in this area and outlines the new California antibiotics law. Part IV situates the federal and state regimes within the
democratic experimentalist framework. Part V analyzes federal preemption as
it applies to the California antibiotics law, concluding that the law should not be
preempted. I conclude by arguing that democratic experimentalism should
inform preemption doctrine in contexts that involve knowledge-intensive and
scientifically uncertain policy areas. Finally, I suggest some lessons states can
learn from the California law’s implementation.
I.
A.

THE RISE OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE

Background on Antibiotics and Their Introduction Into Agriculture

The advent of antibiotic drugs was a miracle of modern medicine, enabling
doctors to cure once deadly infections in a matter of days.17 Lifesaving medical
17.

See, e.g., Stuart B. Levy, The Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, SCI. AM. Mar. 1998, at 46,
http://www.micro.utexas.edu/courses/kalthoff/bio346/PDF/Readings/08Levy%20(1998).pdf
[https://perma.cc/GTD6-GYCZ] (“Ever since antibiotics became widely available in the 1940s,
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procedures that are now commonplace, including surgery, chemotherapy,
transplants, and kidney dialysis, are successful because of the existence of effective
antibiotic drugs that combat the risk of infection inherent to these procedures.18
Antibiotic drugs cure illness, alleviate suffering, and allow humans to live longer
and healthier lives.
The profound effects of antibiotic drugs extend beyond humans to animal
agriculture as well.19 Today, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all antibiotic drugs
in the United States each year are sold and distributed for use in animal agriculture.20 In addition to treating specific instances of bacterial infection, antibiotic drugs are more commonly administered in low, subtherapeutic doses in
animal feed and water for two purposes: production—that is, to promote
growth and feed efficiency—and disease prevention.21 In the late 1940s, pharmaceutical waste was used as a protein source in animal feeds, and farmers
soon noticed that these additions appeared to enhance growth rates without a
corresponding increase in feed consumption.22 Investigation of this phenomenon
revealed that the antibiotic drugs were responsible for the growth promotion and
increased feed efficiency, leading to the widespread use of low doses of antibiotic
drugs in animal feed.23 In addition, as modern industrial agriculture developed,
producers substantially increased the concentration of animals in their facilities to
increase profit margins; correspondingly, the sanitary conditions of these farms
declined.24 The extreme crowding and lack of sanitation that characterize industrial farming created conditions that put animals at increased risk—indeed,
unnatural risk—of infection.25 To enable these production conditions, producers

18.
19.

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

they have been hailed as miracle drugs—magic bullets able to eliminate bacteria without doing
much harm to the cells of treated individuals.”).
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 24.
See, e.g., Jay P. Graham et al., Growth Promoting Antibiotics in Food Animal Production: An Economic
Analysis, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 79, 80 (2007) (“The use of antibiotics to enhance growth and
feed efficiency and reduce mortality in broiler [chicken] production was introduced without
rigorous testing as to efficacy some 50 years ago.”).
Livestock: Use of Antimicrobial Drugs, Senate Floor Analyses, Senate Rules Committee (Sept. 11,
2015); Casey et al., supra note 3, at 1; Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 1010–12; INDUSTRIAL FOOD
ANIMAL PRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2.
ELLEN K. SILBERGELD ET AL., PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD.,
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND HUMAN HEALTH 9 (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/industrial_agriculture/pcifapantbiorprtvpdf.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8JXD-S4VJ] [hereinafter PEW COMMISSION].
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.; KENNETH H. MATHEWS, JR., USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ANTIMICROBIAL DRUG
USE AND VETERINARY COSTS IN U.S. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 3 (2001),
[https://perma.cc/N3UW-XZ6S] (“It is generally conceded that commercial livestock production
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administer antibiotics prophylactically to prevent the herd- and flock-wide
spread of disease.26 Antibiotic drugs allow food producers to cut costs by substituting low doses of antibiotics for other seemingly more costly methods of disease
prevention such as providing more land for animals and maintaining more sanitary living conditions.27
B.

The Rise and Threat of Antibiotic Resistance

The evolution of bacteria resistant to antibiotic drugs is an inevitable consequence of bacterial reproduction and mutation. When antibiotic drugs kill
bacteria, some bacteria resistant to the drugs may survive and reproduce.28 Using
antibiotic drugs at low levels over a long period of time increases the likelihood
of resistant bacteria reproducing.29 In 1945, Sir Arthur Fleming warned about
the dangers of low-dose use of antibiotics as he accepted the Nobel Prize in
Medicine for his work developing the antibiotic drug penicillin: “It is not difficult to make microbes resistant to penicillin in the laboratory by exposing them
to concentrations not sufficient to kill them . . . . [T]here is the danger that the
ignorant man may easily underdose himself and by exposing his microbes to
non-lethal quantities of the drug make them resistant.”30 This warning is precisely the reason that when prescribing a round of antibiotics, doctors today
strongly emphasize the need for patients to finish the entire prescribed course
and not prematurely discontinue use when symptoms subside.
The past seventy-five years of antibiotic use and development have realized
Fleming’s early fears: We have become Fleming’s “ignorant man.” Penicillinresistant Staphylococcus was identified in 1940, when penicillin was only in limited
use.31 Antibiotic-resistant bacteria continued to appear as new antibiotic drugs
were developed. Tetracycline was introduced in 1950, and tetracyclineresistant Shigella was identified in 1959.32 As the use of antibiotics became
more widespread, the time between the introduction of a new antibiotic and the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

in the United States, especially confinement production, would be virtually impossible without
antimicrobial drugs.”).
PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 24.
Id. (finding that U.S. hog producers saved approximately $63 million in feed costs in 1999 due to
their use of low levels of subtherapeutic drugs, and would have suffered an estimated loss of $45.5
million if antibiotic use was banned).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Alexander Fleming, Nobel Lecture, Penicillin, in NOBEL LECTURES IN PHYSIOLOGY OR
MEDICINE 1942–1962, at 83, 93 (1964).
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 28.
Id.
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first identification of bacterial resistance has often shrunk considerably. For
example, levofloxacin was introduced in 1996 and levofloxacin-resistant pneumococcus was identified the same year; Linezolid was introduced in 2000 and
linezolid-resistant Staphylococcus was identified in 2001; ceftaroline was introduced
in 2010 and ceftaroline-resistant Staphylococcus was identified in 2011.33 These
contracted time frames reflect the increasingly widespread problematic uses of
these drugs.34 Furthermore, and of grave concern, scientists have increasingly
identified pan-drug resistant bacteria (bacteria showing resistance to all available
antibiotics).35 Most recently, in November 2015, bacteria resistant to colistin
were first discovered in China.36 As a drug of last resort, colistin is prescribed
when all other antibiotics fail, making it an antibiotic of critical importance.
Just weeks after its initial discovery in China, the resistant bacteria had spread
to Europe, Asia, and Africa.37 Although the current threat is low because other
antibiotics can still treat colistin-resistant bacteria, the existence of colistinresistant bacteria is significant because it raises the prospect of untreatable infections in the future.38 These new bacteria have been found in both farms and in
samples of human infections in Europe, suggesting an interplay between antibiotic use in agriculture and the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans.39
In a 2010 speech before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Director Thomas R. Frieden said: “Without
continuing to improve on our response to the public health problem of antibiotic
resistance, we are potentially headed for a post-antibiotic world in which we will
have few or no clinical interventions for some infections.”40
Antibiotic resistance poses substantial health, safety, and economic concerns.
The CDC reports that two million Americans acquire serious antibiotic-resistant
infections each year, causing 23,000 deaths.41 A study by Tufts University and
Cook County Hospital in Chicago estimated that patients with antibiotic-resistant
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.; Thomas R. Frieden, M.D., M.P.H., Dir., CDC, Antibiotic Resistance and the Threat to
Public Health, Statement before the Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Health, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2010), [https://perma.cc/P7F2-BJJF]
[hereinafter Frieden Statement].
James Gallagher, Bacteria That Resist ‘Last Antibiotic’ Found in UK, BBC (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-35153795 [https://perma.cc/572Y-9Y54].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Frieden Statement, supra note 35.
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 6.
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infections had excess hospitals stays of one to two weeks.42 The methicillinresistant strain of the bacteria Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), which has made
headlines in the past several years for its resistance to treatment and its ability to
thrive in hospital environments, can cause life-threatening bloodstream infections, pneumonia, and surgical site infections.43
Antibiotic resistance also imposes significant economic burdens. The same
Tufts and Cook County Hospital study estimated that the annual healthcare
costs of drug-resistant bacterial infections in the United States is between $16.6
and $26 billion.44 The national economy also suffers: The study estimated that in
2000, the total societal costs of antibiotic-resistant infections to U.S. households
was approximately $35 billion, including lost wages, extended hospital stays, and
premature deaths.45 In addition, these data were collected in 2000, when the rate
of reported antibiotic-resistant infections was half of what it is now; these estimates are likely quite conservative today.46
These issues become even more urgent with the recognition that emerging
economies, including Brazil, India, and China, are projected to increase antibiotic use in animal production by upwards of 100 percent by 2030.47 None of
these countries has prudent antibiotics regulation in place—and some have no
regulations at all on the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.48 The
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

48.

Rebecca R. Roberts et al., Hospital and Societal Costs of Antimicrobial-Resistant Infections in a Chicago
Teaching Hospital: Implications for Antibiotic Stewardship, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE
1175, 1175–84 (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19739972
[https://perma.cc/DQ38-RW5S].
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/mrsa
[https://perma.cc/8XVU-M2ZN].
Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess
of $20 Billion Annually, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 19, 2009, 9:00 AM ET),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/antibiotic-resistant-infections-cost-the-us-healthcaresystem-in-excess-of-20-billion-annually-64727562.html [https://perma.cc/K7AT-PGTM].
Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess
of $20 Billion Annually, supra note 44.
Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess
of $20 Billion Annually, supra note 44.
Thomas P. Van Boeckel et al., Global Trends in Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals, 112 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5649, 5650 (2015); Lance B. Price, Professor, George Washington Univ.
Milken Sch. of Pub. Health, Presentation at Drugs, Animals, and Food: Law & Policy of
Antibiotics in the Food System, Harvard Law School-UCLA Food Law & Policy Conference
(Oct. 23, 2015).
See Price, supra note 47. For example, China has minimal regulations and inadequate monitoring
and enforcement. See Hudson Lockett, Antibiotics Abuse Makes China’s Pork Industry a Hotbed for
Drug-Resistant Bugs, CHINA ECON. REV. (Apr. 13. 2015), http://www.chinaeconomic
review.com/growth-addiction. India has few laws governing antibiotic use in food-producing
animals. CTR. FOR DISEASE DYNAMICS, ECON., & POLY., ANTIBIOTIC USE AND
RESISTANCE IN FOOD ANIMALS: CURRENT POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2016),
http://www.cddep.org/sites/default/files/india_abx_report.pdf. Brazil has only a few regulations
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United States imports agricultural products including meat and produce (which
notoriously carry bacteria from meat products) from all over the world, primarily
from countries that lack prudent antibiotics regulation including China, Brazil,
other South American countries, and to a lesser extent India.49 In order to protect its population, the United States must take the lead in quality control in antibiotic use with regard to this imported meat. But the quick and intercontinental
spread of colistin-resistant bacteria suggests that the United States must go even
further in promoting judicious use of antibiotics domestically and globally: Even if
the United States does not produce antibiotic-treated meat, it will not be insulated
from the effects of global routine uses of antibiotics. Given the global consequences of antibiotic resistance, it is imperative for the United States to be a
leader in devising a comprehensive solution rather than to continue to be a primary culprit in worsening the problem. It can begin to do so by reducing and
eventually eliminating routine use of antibiotics in this country and by requiring
the same from its trading partners.
1.

The Link Between Agricultural Use and Resistance in Humans

There are two main classes of use of antibiotic drugs: clinical use in humans
and agricultural use in food-producing animals. It is well accepted that the misuse
of antibiotics in human healthcare is an important contributor to antibiotic

49.

restricting the use of specific antibiotics. See, e.g., Instrução Normativa No. 14, de 17 de Maio de
2012, Diário Official da União [D.O.U.] de 18.5.2012 (Braz.) (banning the antibiotics spiramycin
and erythromycin); Portaria No. 97, Art. 15 § 2, de 28 de Julho de 2008, Ministerio da Agricultura,
Pecuária e Abastecimento de 29.7.2008 (Braz.) (establishing that animal feed can only contain one
antibiotic and one anticoccidial).
Brazil is the eighth-largest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States, including $307
million in red meats each year. It is also the second-largest supplier of prepared meats ($221.8
million in 2014).
Brazil, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/brazil [https://perma.cc/FRX6-4GWX]; U.S. Food
Imports, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/us-food-imports
[https://perma.cc/73RL-WKWP] (follow “Meats and Meat Products” hyperlink under “Value of
U.S. food imports, detailed tables by food group”); USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.,
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/923Z-3A96]. China is the thirdlargest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States and the third-largest supplier of poultry
($24.8 million in 2014). The People’s Republic of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republicchina [https://perma.cc/7CB7-NLN8]; U.S. Food Imports, supra; USDA FOREIGN AGRIC.
SERV., supra. India is the fifth-largest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States. India,
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-centralasia/india [https://perma.cc/9Z9J-NTQY].
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resistance and a problem in all healthcare settings.50 According to the CDC,
prescribing antibiotics in outpatient settings could be reduced by more than 30
percent without worsening health outcomes for patients.51 But to what extent
does the overuse and misuse of antibiotics in agriculture affect the prevalence of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans? It is undisputed that antibiotic-resistant
bacteria have breached the species barrier between food-producing animals and
humans multiple times, making it plausible that resistant pathogens acquired
from livestock have a direct effect on human health.52 The scientific evidence
has found that the “possibility for animal-to-human transmission . . . brings
heightened concerns about livestock as potential reservoirs of zoonotic infections
that may with further evolution become adapted to circulation within the human
population.”53 It is important to note that due to limited data and the complexity
of studying the epidemiology of transmission, scientists do not yet know the precise mechanisms through which the transfer of resistant bacteria occurs, nor the
extent to which these transfers are occurring, making it difficult to quantify the
relationship between antibiotic use in animals and the occurrence of clinical
resistance in humans.54 However, in the most comprehensive assessment of the
topic to date, an expert panel of the World Health Organization (WHO), Food
and Agriculture Organization, and World Organization for Animal Health
found “clear evidence of adverse human health consequences due to resistant
organisms resulting from non-human usage of antimicrobials.”55 In addition,
numerous studies have traced human infection by drug-resistant pathogens back
to animal sources.56
The transfer of antibiotic-resistant bacteria from food-producing animals to
the human population occurs in various ways: through food-borne contact (such
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Alicia Demirjian et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Getting Smart About Antibiotics, 64 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 871, 871 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm6432a3.htm [https://perma.cc/8V48-WPDP].
Battle of the Bugs: Fighting Antibiotic Resistance, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources
ForYou/Consumers/ucm143568.htm [https://perma.cc/VX26-PA29].
Chang, supra note 11.
Id. at 242–43.
Id.; Henrik C. Wegener, Antibiotic Resistance—Linking Human and Animal Health, in
IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY
331 (Eileen R. Choffnes et al. eds., 2012).
Wegener, supra note 54, at 334.
See, e.g., Timothy F. Jones et al., An Outbreak of Community-Acquired Foodborne Illness Caused by
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 82 (2002);
M. Teuber, Spread of Antibiotic Resistance With Food-Borne Pathogens, 56 CELLULAR &
MOLECULAR LIFE SCI. 755 (1999); David G. White et al., The Isolation of Antibiotic-Resistant
Salmonella From Retail Ground Meats, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147 (2001); David G. White et
al., Antimicrobial Resistance of Foodborne Pathogens, 4 MICROBES & INFECTION 405 (2002).

564

64 UCLA L. REV. 550 (2017)

as meat consumption); direct animal contact; and environmental contact, particularly when manure is spread via air, water, dust, and soil.57 Food-borne contact
occurs when antibiotic-resistant bacteria remains on meat that is not processed
or cooked properly and spreads to humans.58 It can also occur when fertilizer or
water containing animal feces and antibiotic-resistant bacteria is used on food crops
that are then ingested by humans.59 This route of exposure and the nonfood-borne
routes of exposure mean that consumers may not even need to eat meat to be
affected by antibiotic resistance. The nonfood routes of exposure also suggest
that those who live nearer to production facilities may be at greater risk to environmental exposure.60
Despite the knowledge that misuse of antibiotic drugs hastens the evolution
of drug-resistant bacteria and that antibiotic-resistant bacteria in food-producing
animals can transfer to humans, misuse of antibiotics in agriculture has shown no
signs of slowing down.61 In fact, their misuse continues to increase despite significant outbreaks of drug-resistant bacteria and mounting evidence showing
the increasing proliferation and consequences of antibiotic resistance, including
from use in agriculture.62 The most recent data show that sales and distribution of
medically important antibiotic drugs for use in food-producing animals increased
23 percent from 2009 to 2014.63 It is difficult to determine actual usage figures
with certainty because data on antibiotic administration in food-producing animals are extremely limited and the FDA is only required to collect and report
data on sales, and not on actual usage. Using sales data as a proxy, however, suggests that actual usage is also likely to be high.64
Another relevant question is whether the antibiotics administered to foodproducing animals are the same as those administered to humans, such that the
generation of bacteria resistant to the animal drugs would have any effect on
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 7–9; see also ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN
THE US, supra note 2, at 36–37; Casey et al., supra note 3.
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 14.
Id.
See Casey et al., supra note 3, at 1989.
See FDA, 2014 SUMMARY REPORT ON ANTIMICROBIALS SOLD OR DISTRIBUTED FOR USE
IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS 6 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/User
Fees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFA/UCM476258.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS9D-CEBA].
See ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 11.
FDA, supra note 61, at 6.
See MARGARET MELLON ET AL., HOGGING IT: ESTIMATES OF ANTIMICROBIAL ABUSE IN
LIVESTOCK (2001), http://www.iatp.org/files/Hogging_It_Estimates_of_Antimicrobial_Abuse_
in.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KHR-RHH4]; Ralph Loglisci, New FDA Numbers Reveal Food Animals
Consume Lion’s Share of Antibiotics, CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.livablefutureblog.com/2010/12/new-fda-numbers-reveal-food-animals-consumelion%E2%80%99s-share-of-antibiotics [https://perma.cc/2GPL-QYKK].
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humans. In short, the answer is yes. As of 2014, 62 percent of the antibiotics
administered to food-producing animals were medically important to humans.65
Because these antibiotics are the same or substantially similar to those used on
humans, as antibiotic-resistant bacteria spread, the treatment of humans becomes
less effective and the rates of antibiotic-resistant infections grow.66
In 2003, the National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine stated:
“Clearly, a decrease in the inappropriate use of antimicrobials in human medicine
is not enough. Substantial efforts must be made to decrease inappropriate overuse
of antimicrobials in animals and agriculture as well.”67 The CDC68 and WHO69
agree, joining a chorus of scientific, public health, and environmental professionals70 who recognize the threat current industrial farm practices pose and who
have specifically targeted animal agriculture as an area of needed regulation and
private sector behavior change.71 However, antibiotics are attractive to food
producers because they enable those producers to use less feed and to maintain
less sanitary conditions and smaller, cramped living spaces.72 The perception
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

71.
72.

FDA, supra note 61, at 30.
See INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2. See generally PEW
COMMISSION, supra note 21; Roberts et al., supra note 42.
MARK S. SMOLINKSI ET AL., MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH: EMERGENCE,
DETECTION AND RESPONSE 207 (2003).
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 37 (recognizing that
“[s]cientists around the world have provided strong evidence that antibiotic use in food-producing
animals can harm public health” and concluding that “antibiotics should be used in foodproducing animals only under veterinary oversight and only to manage and treat infectious diseases,
not to promote growth”).
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT OF
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 37 (2001), http://www.who.int/drugresistance/WHO_Global_
Strategy_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8B-NNNG] (recognizing that inappropriate
antibiotic use poses an emerging public health threat and that antibiotics are commonly misused in
animal production, and recommending that governments “terminate or rapidly phase out the use of
antibiotics for growth promotion if they are also used for treatment of humans”).
See generally Jerome A. Paulson & Theoklis E. Zaoutis, Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents
in Animal Agriculture: Implications for Pediatrics, 136 PEDIATRICS 1670 (2015); REVIEW ON
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, ANTIMICROBIALS IN AGRICULTURE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: REDUCING UNNECESSARY USE AND WASTE (2015), http://amrreview.org/Publications (follow “8 December 2015-Antimicrobials in agriculture” hyperlink)
[https://perma.cc/XQ98-D4GK]; Van Boeckel et al., supra note 47; FDA, supra note 61; Putting
Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM
ANIMAL PRODUCTION FANSITE, http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7H2G-9JEM].
See generally PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21.
See LISA Y. LEFFERTS ET AL., FEED FOR FOOD PRODUCING ANIMALS: A RESOURCE ON
INGREDIENTS, THE INDUSTRY, AND REGULATION, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE
FUTURE 6 (2007), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-centerfor-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/animal_feed.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KT-BXTB];
MATHEWS, supra note 25, at 3. But see Jay P. Graham et al., Growth Promoting Antibiotics in Food
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traditionally has been that reducing prophylactic antibiotic use would significantly
raise costs for many food producers, which has led some in the animal agriculture
industry to oppose these efforts.73 It is unclear, however, that these concerns are
merited. In Denmark, the economic impacts of banning the subtherapeutic use
of antibiotics have been minimal.74 The ban has resulted in an increased production cost for hogs of just over 1 percent and no net increase in costs for poultry production.75 Overall, the combination of production effects on hogs and
poultry farmers has caused a loss of just 0.03 percent to Denmark’s economy.76
In addition, even though some large food chains have committed to phasing out the use of antibiotics in the meat in their products over the next decade,77
industry resistance and continually rising rates of antibiotic use draw into question
whether voluntary measures can be effective and whether their timeframe is
acceptable. These doubts are amplified when taking into account that many
emerging economies that export meat to the United States are projected to more
than double their use of antibiotics in the next fifteen years.78 More likely, the
realities of modern industrial farm animal production will require regulation to
stem the growing rates of antibiotic resistance.
Finally, it is important to mention the realistic potential effect of regulating
antibiotic use in food-producing animals. Evidence from Denmark, where the
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals is banned, has shown
that since the ban, human resistance trends appear to be mirroring the decline in
use of antibiotics in agriculture.79 Some studies suggest that regulation may have

73.

74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

Animal Production: An Economic Analysis, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 79, 80 (2007) (collecting largescale empirical data collected by U.S. industry that demonstrates that the use of growth-promoting
antibiotics in poultry production is associated with economic losses to producers).
See MATHEWS, supra note 25 (stating in its abstract that “discontinuing the use of antimicrobial
drugs in hog production would initially decrease feed efficiency, raise food costs, reduce production
and raise prices to consumers”); Scott M. Russell, Ban Antibiotics in Poultry? Why the Policymakers
Have It Wrong, WATT POULTRY USA, Mar. 2003, at 16, 22.
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AVOIDING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: DENMARK’S BAN ON
GROWTH PROMOTING ANTIBIOTICS IN FOOD ANIMALS, http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/issue_briefs/denmarkexperiencepdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73LX-GEC8].
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Jennifer Hackett, Subway Joins Other Fast-Food Giants to Cut Back on Antibiotics, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/subway-joins-other-fast-food-giantsto-cut-back-on-antibiotics [https://perma.cc/AW2C-665T]; Stephanie Strom, McDonald’s
Moving to Limit Antibiotic Use in Chickens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/05/business/mcdonalds-moving-to-antibiotic-free-chicken.html?_r=0
[https://
perma.cc/7SH6-DPP3].
Van Boeckel et al., supra note 47, at 5649–54; Price, supra note 47.
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 74.
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little effect on reducing the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria already
present in humans.80 Instead, “the greatest value in restricting antibiotics use, as is
the case in human medicine, may not be in reversing resistance, but in preventing
further increases in prevalence.”81 It is possible that the antibiotic resistance that
has already occurred and spread to humans cannot be undone. In light of this
potential irreversibility, it is imperative to minimize the development of new
resistant strains of bacteria for current drugs that have not yet led to resistant
bacteria, and for future antibiotics that have yet to be developed. In either case—
whether to reverse antibiotic resistance in humans or prevent future increases—it
is important to begin regulating the misuse of antibiotics in food-producing animals immediately to reduce threats to public health, particularly where there is a
risk those threats will become irreversible in the future. To maximize efficiency,
legislators should consider using a democratic experimentalist framework in
enacting these laws.
II.
A.

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

Introduction to Democratic Experimentalism

Democratic experimentalism is a process of developing laws and policies in
which central institutions delegate authority to subnational jurisdictions to pursue
generally declared goals.82 The central institution plays a managerial role, using
information gathered from local institutions to assess and compare local performances and then to reassess and revise initial benchmarks.83 Under the democratic
experimentalist model, the centralized government works with autonomous and
decentralized local actors to develop efficient and adaptable rules that respond to
local conditions and participating actors.84 Democratic experimentalism thus
combines respect for local variation with centrally coordinated structure and discipline.85 Its central thrust is to induce continuous learning and revision of standards,
emphasizing deliberative engagement among officials and stakeholders.86
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Chang, supra note 11, at 244.
Id.
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54–55 (2011).
See id. at 79.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 316–17 (1998).
Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 78.
Id. at 55.
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Democratic experimentalist scholars contend that this form of lawmaking—
developed in the private sphere and transplanted into the public sphere—has
great potential to help solve seemingly intractable problems of our time, especially in the context of the modern administrative state.87 Indeed, although
democratic experimentalism has thus far maintained a somewhat low profile in
legal scholarship, it has manifested in practice in several recent regulatory initiatives, including for example the Food Safety Modernization Act and the Race to
the Top Education program.88 In order to understand the salience of democratic
experimentalism to modern problem-solving, it is important to understand the
context in which the modern administrative state arose and the ways in which it
has subsequently shifted.
The modern administrative state arose in a context in which the primary
problem in legislating could be identified as “official ignorance”: Congress did not
have adequate expertise to make law in certain areas. Recognizing the limits of its
knowledge, it created expert administrative agencies and delegated to them the
authority to regulate in the relevant areas.89 Over the past eighty years, however,
“the problem has shifted from ignorance to uncertainty”: The impediment to
effective lawmaking is no longer congressional ignorance, but rather uncertainty
on the part of all players about how to solve a new set of seemingly intractable
problems.90 Expertise is insufficient to solve problems whose solutions are uncertain, such as those associated with antibiotic resistance, and also for example,
pollution, police abuse, prisons, welfare, housing, education, mental health, and
so on.91 Instead, pervasive uncertainty about how best to solve these problems
requires joint collaboration, experimentation, and empirical testing of potential
solutions.92 Democratic experimentalist theory emerges as an attractive and
pragmatic new approach to problem-solving—and perhaps unsurprisingly, one
that regulatory initiatives are increasingly, albeit unknowingly, adopting. Precisely
because it is premised on continuous learning, deliberative engagement, and revision of standards, democratic experimentalism deals directly with the problem of
uncertainty, promising improved substantive outcomes. In giving rise to a newly
conceived democratic community,93 it also gives rise to an improved democratic
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 CONTEMP.
PRAGMATISM 35, 42 (2012); Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55–56.
Sabel, supra note 87, at 42.
Id. at 43.
See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004).
See Sabel, supra note 87, at 43.
Id.
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process for problem-solving and legislating. Both procedurally and substantively,
democratic experimentalism offers significant potential.
B.

Democratic Experimentalism And Antibiotics

Democratic experimentalist theory contends that “policy experimentation
is central to optimal policy choices.”94 Certain problems—including the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics—are particularly well suited to applying democratic experimentalism as a regulatory framework and problem-solving
mechanism. Scientifically related problems and policies especially lend themselves to experimentalism. Because the trial and error approach lies at the heart of
scientific inquiry, experimentation is especially well suited to scientific policies and
regulatory cultures, including, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency95 and the Food Safety Modernization Act.96 In the face of a scientific question
and scientific uncertainty—such as how to reduce air pollution, improve food
safety, or eliminate subtherapeutic antibiotic use—it is critical to combine experimentation with multi-stage, continuous feedback policymaking97 to solve
problems as efficiently and swiftly as possible. Efficient, swift problem-solving
derived from experimentalism is even more critical where a problem presents
a significant threat to public health and risks widespread or long-term harm if
left unaddressed—as in the case of antibiotic resistance.
In addition, like air pollution, antibiotic-resistant bacteria are an uncontainable externality whose harm is not immediately attributable to any one source.
There is little incentive for private actors to abate their subtherapeutic antibiotic use
unless all other private actors also do so, and indeed, the positive effects of eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use are not maximized unless all actors participate.98
Without unanimous collective action to eliminate subtherapeutic doses, resistant
bacteria will continue to breed and spread at unacceptable rates. Pragmatic government action beyond voluntary guidelines is necessary to address this unpriced
externality of breeding antibiotic-resistant pathogens.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 557 (2015).
Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129–30, 153 (2014).
Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55–56.
See Gubler, supra note 95, at 129–31.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL ACTION PLAN ON ANTIMICROBIAL
RESISTANCE (2015), http://www.wpro.who.int/entity/drug_resistance/resources/global_action_
plan_eng.pdf (“[S]ystematic misuse and overuse of these drugs in human medicine and food
production have put every nation at risk. Few replacement products are in the pipeline. Without
harmonized and immediate action on a global scale, the world is heading towards a post-antibiotic
era in which common infections could once again kill.”).
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At the same time that structured, disciplined government action is necessary,
the regulatory scheme must also be adequately flexible to account for significant
local variances associated with reducing subtherapeutic antibiotic use. The intricacies of eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use vary according both to locality
and type of animal, whether pigs, cattle, or poultry, such that a top-down,
command-and-control approach will not adequately account for local circumstances to be effective. Democratic experimentalism provides a key theoretical
lens for regulating in the antibiotics context, because it accounts for the scientific nature of the problem and its critical threat to public health, and mandates
structured, disciplined action while still flexibly accounting for local circumstances.
This Article turns next to a history of federal and state action in antibiotics regulation before explaining how to adapt democratic experimentalist theory in the
agricultural antibiotics context.
III.
A.

FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION IN ANTIBIOTICS REGULATION

History of Federal Regulation in Antibiotics

The history of federal action in the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in foodproducing animals is long and complex, spanning nearly sixty-five years and across
all three branches of the federal government. A comprehensive understanding of
the intricate web of FDA action, executive action, and congressional action and
inaction, punctuated by judicial action, is crucial to analyzing whether and how
preemption arguments will apply to state laws regulating subtherapeutic antibiotic use and to understanding how democratic experimentalism can best be
adapted to address this problem.
1.

FDA and Judicial Action

In the 1950s, the FDA, acting pursuant to its authority under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to approve new animal drugs, approved
applications for the use of various antibiotics in food-producing animals at
subtherapeutic levels for the purposes of growth promotion, feed efficiency,
and disease prevention.99 The FDA approved that the antibiotics could be
administered on a herd- or flock-wide basis, rather than to specific diseased animals.100 At the time, little was known about the effects that routine, low-level
99.

See NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir.
2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (2012).
100. NRDC, 872 F. Supp. 2d. at 322.
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use of antibiotics on food-producing animals could have on increased antibiotic
resistance in humans.101 By the late 1960s, however, scientific evidence began
to link the two.102 In 1970, FDA responded by assembling a task force of scientists from the FDA, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the CDC, academia, and industry, to study the risks associated
with this routine use of subtherapeutic antibiotics in agriculture.103 The task
force report, published in 1972, found that the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria in humans had increased; the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals,
especially at subtherapeutic levels, promotes the development of antibioticresistant bacteria; animals that consume antibiotics may serve as a reservoir of
antibiotic pathogens, which can produce human infections; and the prevalence
of bacteria carrying transferable resistant genes for multiple antibiotics had
increased in animals—which it found was related to the subtherapeutic use of
antibiotics.104 Among other recommendations, the task force urged that antibiotics that are medically important to humans be prohibited from use in foodproducing animals unless they met safety criteria established by the FDA.105 It
also recommended that several specific antibiotics only be used therapeutically
unless they met specific safety criteria for non-therapeutic use.106
In response to the task force findings, the FDA in 1973 proposed to withdraw
approval for all subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics in food-producing animals
unless industry submitted data within two years that resolved conclusively the
safety of such antibiotic use, pursuant to specific FDA criteria.107 Among the
most important of these criteria was the requirement that subtherapeutic use of
an antibiotic drug be shown not to promote increased antibiotic resistance in
humans.108
The withdrawal of approval did not take place in 1975 as threatened. Instead,
after reviewing the evidence industry submitted, in 1977, the FDA proposed to
withdraw approval of all subtherapeutic uses of penicillin in livestock and to restrict
subtherapeutic use of two tetracyclines in livestock, finding that the use of the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See FDA, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BY
THE FDA TASK FORCE IN THE USE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN ANIMAL FEEDS, supra note 4, at 3.
See id.
See id. at 10.
See id.
See Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 9,811, 9,813 (Apr. 20,
1973) (codified at former 21 C.F.R. § 135.109; renumbered at 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013)).
108. See Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,772, 43,774 (Aug.
30, 1977).

104.
105.
106.
107.
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drugs in this manner was no longer safe.109 The agency issued notices of an
opportunity for hearing over the proposed withdrawal and over twenty drug
sponsors requested hearings, but the hearings were never held and the FDA never
took any further action on the proposed withdrawals.110 In the early 1980s, the
FDA began approving new animal drug applications for the subtherapeutic use
of penicillin and tetracycline in food-producing animals.111 Counterintuitively,
given its previous finding that the subtherapeutic use of these antibiotics was no
longer safe, the FDA stated that new drug approvals should not be denied while
it conducted its ongoing research into their safety.112
For twenty years, the FDA took no action. In 1999, five advocacy groups
submitted a Citizen Petition to the FDA requesting that it follow through with
revoking approval of the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics as it pledged to do in
1973 and 1977.113 The FDA issued two tentative responses in 1999 and 2001
stating that it could not make a final decision at that time.114 Several other advocacy groups filed another petition in 2005 with a similar request, again with no
agency response.115 In the face of another decade of FDA silence, in May 2011,
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and several other advocacy
organizations filed a lawsuit against the FDA, seeking to compel the agency to
initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the subtherapeutic use of penicillin
and tetracycline in livestock.116 The lawsuit alleged that the FDA had unlawfully
“withheld agency action” in violation of the FDCA and the Administrative
Procedure Act and that the FDA was obligated by its 1977 findings to withdraw
approvals of the relevant drugs.117 During the lawsuit, the FDA finally responded
to the 1999 and 2005 Citizen Petitions, denying them both.118 The district
109. See Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. at 43,774;
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for
Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264, 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977).
See Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds, Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,827, 53,827
(Nov. 17, 1978); see also NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d
151 (2d Cir. 2014); Winters, supra note 6, at 1061.
Withdrawal of Approval, 48 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Feb. 1, 1983); see New Animal Drugs for Use in
Animal Feeds; Penicillin-and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing
Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. 4490, 4490 (proposed Feb. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 558).
New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin-and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and
Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. at 4490–91; Winters, supra note 6, at 1061.
See generally NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d
Cir. 2014).
See id. at 325.
Winters, supra note 6, at 1062–63.
NRDC v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 137 n.6.
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court found for the plaintiffs and directed the FDA to begin the withdrawal
proceedings.119
While the case was on appeal, in 2012, the FDA issued its finalized Guidance
for Industry #209 on the Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial
Drugs in Food-Producing Animals.120 Because of the time and expense of
withdrawal proceedings, the FDA advocated against withdrawal of approval and
in favor of a voluntary system of industry withdrawal as a more efficient strategy
to reduce subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals.121 Guidance #209 established
the voluntary framework for this reduction. It recommended that the “use of
medically important antimicrobial drugs in food-producing animals should be
limited to those uses that are considered necessary for assuring animal health” and
to bring the use of antibiotics under the oversight of licensed veterinarians.122
The FDA followed up one year later in December 2013 with Guidance for
Industry #213, which provides recommendations on how to voluntarily comply
with Guidance #209.123 The next year, in 2014, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court in the NRDC case, finding that the FDA had acted within its
authority by not withdrawing approval of the subtherapeutic drugs.124 Although
the public interest organizations ultimately lost this case, it likely played a role in
prompting the FDA to publish its voluntary guidance documents.125
119. Id. at 151.
120. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY #209: THE JUDICIOUS USE OF MEDICALLY IMPORTANT

121.
122.
123.

124.
125.

ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS (2012), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM21
6936.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VW-6L3P].
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY #213: NEW ANIMAL DRUGS AND NEW ANIMAL DRUG
COMBINATION PRODUCTS ADMINISTERED IN OR ON MEDICATED FEED OR DRINKING
WATER OF FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG SPONSORS FOR
VOLUNTARILY ALIGNING PRODUCT USE CONDITIONS WITH GFI #209 (2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guidancef
orIndustry/UCM299624.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q4E-VVSH].
Guidance #213 includes
nonbinding recommendations intended to inform new animal drug producers how to comply
voluntarily with the principles outlined in Guidance #209. Guidance #213 requests that drug
companies voluntarily withdraw approvals to market antibiotics for use in animal feed and water for
“production purposes” such as growth promotion and feed efficiency. It also requests that
companies voluntarily amend approvals to market antibiotics over the counter so that a veterinary
prescription or veterinary feed directive (VFD) is required to purchase and use these drugs in feed
and water.
See NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2014).
Press Release, NRDC, NRDC Petitions FDA: Agency’s Weak Attempt to Curb Antibiotic
Abuse in the Livestock Industry Is Failing (Sept. 13 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/media/
2016/160913 [https://perma.cc/8KHA-39G2].
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Finally, in October 2015, the FDA’s Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD), a
final rule, came into effect and created a legal loophole for the subtherapeutic use
of antibiotics.126 A VFD drug is defined as a new animal drug intended for use in
animal feed that can only be used under veterinary supervision.127 This category
of drugs can be distinguished from over-the-counter drugs (which do not require
a prescription or any veterinary oversight) and prescription drugs (which require a
prescription from a veterinarian and a pharmacist to dispense).128 At present, all
products affected by FDA’s plan—feed-use antibiotic drugs used for production
purposes—are available over-the-counter.129 However, if drug sponsors, who
own the right to market the product, voluntarily modify the use conditions of
their antibiotic feed drugs per Guidance #213 so that the drugs require veterinary
supervision, the drugs will then become VFD drugs.130 Twenty-five out of
twenty-six of the current drug sponsors, representing over 99.95% of the total
sales of products affected by Guidance #213,131 have committed to change the
use conditions of their feed-use drugs so that they are VFD.132 By voluntarily
changing their drugs’ use conditions, drug sponsors bind the drugs to the conditions of this final rule, which prohibits using antibiotic drugs for growth promotion
or feed efficiency. The drugs can then only be used for therapeutic purposes,
including subtherapeutic disease prevention.133 To comply with the guidance,
pharmaceutical companies will simply have to remove “growth promotion” as an
indication from the affected drugs’ labels. Producers can continue to use the
drugs in the same way as before but must say they are now using them for disease
prevention purposes rather than growth promotion purposes.134
126. Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,708, 31,708 (June 3, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.

pts. 514, 558).
127. Id. at 31,708.
128. Id.
129. FDA’s Strategy on Antimicrobial Resistance-Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
130.
131.

132.
133.
134.

AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm216939.htm
[http://perma.cc/CB56-Z73P].
Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. at 31,710.
These twenty-five drug sponsors hold 99.6 percent of the applications affected by Guidance #213
and represent 99.95 percent of the total sales of products affected by Guidance #213. FDA Update
on Animal Pharmaceutical Industry Response to Guidance #213, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AntimicrobialResistance/JudiciousUseofAntimicrobials/ucm390
738.htm [https://perma.cc/5WBC-Q6XG]. The one company that has not agreed to participate in
the FDA’s voluntary plan, Pharmaq AS, makes a drug used only in fish. Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s
Continuing Incapacity on Livestock Antibiotics, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 325, 334–35 (2014).
FDA Update on Animal Pharmaceutical Industry Response to Guidance #213, supra note 131.
Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. at 31,710.
Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 337–43.
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This loophole perhaps suggests why drug sponsors have been so easily
convinced to comply with the VFD. Indeed, one drug sponsor has stated it does
not anticipate any drop in revenues as a result of complying with the FDA
plan,135 and another is planning to have its drug reclassified as prevention-related
rather than production-related to bypass this hurdle.136 Bacteria, however, do not
distinguish between low doses of antibiotics administered for production purposes
and low doses administered for disease prevention. By leaving this loophole open
and giving veterinarians wide discretion to approve antibiotic drug use, the
FDA’s voluntary plan is poised to have little to no actual effect on reducing antibiotic use in food-producing animals.137
It is of particular note that Guidance #209 and the VFD are the first time
the FDA has ever drawn a distinction between production and disease prevention
in evaluating antibiotic risk.138 Since the early 1970s and as recently as 2003 and
2012, the FDA has not distinguished between the two when referring to subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics that need to be eliminated.139 The FDA provides no reasoning for its departure from its own previous practice or for its decision to start
promoting the limitation on the use of one (production purposes) but not the
other (disease prevention).140
The stated purpose of the VFD is to simplify the process of becoming a VFD
drug, to facilitate the transition of feed-use antibiotic drugs from over-the-counter
to VFD status, and to make the VFD process less burdensome to navigate.141 In
reality, however, if the FDA can convince all drug sponsors to comply, the VFD
is in fact a back-door means for the agency to ban the use of antibiotics for growth
promotion purposes without having to go through the process of promulgating a
final rule to that effect.
In addition, the implementation of the VFD may not prove to be as simple a
process to reduce antibiotic use as it purports to be, because the FDA’s approach
has several limitations. First, it requires numerous layers of complex and sustained
voluntary action from drug sponsors beyond just the initial written agreement
135. Beth Hoffman, New FDA ‘Rules’ Not Likely to Reduce Antibiotic Use on Farm, FORBES (Dec. 13,
136.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bethhoffman/2013/12/13/new-fda-rules-willnot-reduce-antibiotic-use-on-farm [https://perma.cc/NR4M-JPWD].
Richard Coulter & Larry L. Miller, The Future of Stafac® (Virginiamycin) for Veterinary UseCompany Statement, PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORP. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://phibropro.com/
downloads/GN13002USA0413-%20GFI%20209%20and%20213%20PAH%20Public
%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QGY-3B4B].
Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 337–43.
Id. at 338–39.
Id.
Id.
Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. at 31,710.
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they have already given.142 It also requires all drug sponsors to remain in compliance throughout the entire process in order to be effective. In other words, the
plan relies on all of the (profit-maximizing, self-interested) entities not to change
their minds partway through the process and decide to capitalize on the new
market opportunity left open by all of the other drug sponsors exiting the market
for antibiotics used for production purposes.143 The FDA has no consequence or
strategy in place if drug sponsors drop out along the way and render the plan
impotent.144 Between the disease prevention loophole and the faulty reliance on
voluntary industry action, the end result of the FDA plan is that what may at first
seem to be the FDA attempting to find a clever alternative to limit antibiotic
use—one that bypasses time- and resource-consuming formal processes—could,
upon closer inspection, make no appreciable difference. In addition, because the
FDA does not require data collection on the use of antibiotics in food-producing
animals, it will not even be possible to track the effect of the agency’s plan on the
use of these types of antibiotics or on the prevalence of antibiotic resistance in
humans.
2.

Executive and Congressional (In)Action

In September 2014, the White House released an Executive Order and a
National Strategy for combating antibiotic-resistant bacteria.145 The Executive
Order mandates that the FDA “continue taking steps to eliminate the use of
medically important classes of antibiotics for growth promotion purposes in
food-producing animals.”146 Similarly, the accompanying National Strategy aims
to end the use of medically important antibiotics for growth promotion in foodproducing animals and to bring antibiotic use for disease prevention under veterinary oversight.147 In other words, it is essentially a recapitulation of the FDA
voluntary guidance and VFD; not surprisingly, it promotes implementation of
the FDA voluntary guidance to achieve these aims, and advocates for enhanced
142.
143.
144.
145.

Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 333–37.
Id.
Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,676: Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 184 Fed. Reg. 56,931, 56,933
(Sept. 18, 2014); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTICRESISTANT BACTERIA (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb_
national_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSD8-U3CQ].
146. Exec. Order No. 13,676: Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931, 56,933
(Sept. 18, 2004).
147. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 145.
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data collection to track the problem, educational outreach, and raising public
awareness.148
Congressional action in the area of antibiotics has been even less impactful
than executive action. The Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act
(PAMTA) and its Senate companion bill, the Preventing Antibiotics Resistance
Act (PARA), could have a significant effect on reducing problematic antibiotic
use if passed. These bills would require the FDA to withdraw approvals of nontherapeutic uses of medically important antibiotics in food animals, except where
a company holding an approval demonstrates with reasonable certainty that the
nontherapeutic use of the drug will not harm human health by promoting the
development of antibiotic resistance.149 The bills specifically list routine disease
prevention as a nontherapeutic use.150 PAMTA, however, has languished in
Congress for sixteen years since its initial introduction in 1999.151 PARA has
similarly made no progress since it was first introduced in 2013.152
The federal government, including the FDA, would unquestionably be the
strongest actor to promulgate antibiotic regulation. Despite increasing pressure
from elected officials, experts, and advocates to take stronger action in this area,153
federal reform on the issue has proven elusive. There is a patchwork of federal
activity on the matter across all three branches of government, but no comprehensive federal scheme. Although the FDA has attempted to set up a mechanism binding industry to its voluntary commitments, the agency ultimately relies
on the charity of corporate drug sponsors for the success of its plan, and even so,
leaves a big disease prevention loophole—a loophole large enough to render the
entire effort meaningless.
148. Id. at 8–9.
149. H.R. 1552, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1552/text
150.
151.
152.
153.

[https://perma.cc/3HFT-D53V]; S. 621, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/114/s621/text [https://perma.cc/KKN3-6VQE].
H.R. 1552; S. 621.
See H.R. 1552; Lydia Zuraw, Rep. Slaughter Reintroduces Preservation of Antibiotics Legislation,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/rep-slaughterreintroduces-preservation-of-antibiotics-legislation [https://perma.cc/GMY9-8EJE].
See S. 621.
JAY A. GREGORY, AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES (A-14), REPORT OF REFERENCE
COMMITTEE E, http://www.mag.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ama14-refcommE-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TW5-BRFJ]; Tell FDA to Protect Public Health, Not Animal Factories, CTR.
FOR FOOD SAFETY (2014), http://salsa3.salsalabs.com/o/1881/p/dia/action3/common/public/
?action_KEY=13354 [https://perma.cc/5DNS-YYER]; Press Release, Senators Warren,
Feinstein & Gillibrand Question FDA About Efforts to Curb Antibiotic Overuse in Food
Animals (July 28, 2014), http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=582 [https://
perma.cc/CZ3N-WV9X].
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Despite having articulated over forty years ago the need to eliminate lowdose antibiotic use in food-producing animals, the federal government still has
not implemented a coherent, robust legal scheme to achieve it. Understanding
this history helps explain why routine subtherapeutic antibiotic use in foodproducing animals continues to grow. Although the federal government has the
power to effect meaningful and sweeping change, thus far the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches have declined to do so.
B.

State Action and the California Antibiotics Law

In the absence of effective federal action, some states have attempted to enact
their own laws and policies curbing antibiotic use in food-producing animals.154
To date, all of the proposed state bills except one have been voted down or have
languished in state legislatures.155 In October 2015, California became the first
and only state to enact a law that will prohibit the routine use of antibiotics in
food-producing animals.156 When SB-27 goes into effect in January 2018, the
law will prohibit the use of antibiotics both for production purposes as well as for
routine disease prevention, closing the significant loophole left open by the FDA
voluntary scheme.157 Administering antibiotic drugs to food-producing animals
will only be permissible when ordered by a licensed veterinarian through a prescription or VFD, in the context of a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship.158
The use of antibiotic drugs will only be permissible to treat disease, to control the
spread of disease, in connection with a surgery or medical procedure, or for
prophylaxis in the event of an elevated risk of a particular disease.159 Antibiotics
154. These states include, for example, California, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Minnesota, and

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

West Virginia, which have each proposed legislation multiple times to regulate or prohibit routine
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals. See A.B. 1437, 2013–14 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 835, 2014 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2014); AgricultureCommercial Feed and Drinking Water-Antimicrobial Drug Prohibition, S.B. 520 (Md. 2013);
An Act Prohibiting the Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Drugs for Food Animals and the
Sale of Food Produced from Animals Administered Antimicrobial Drugs for Nontherapeutic
Uses, H.F. 1290 (Minn. 2013–14); S.F. 1285, 88th Leg. (Minn. 2013); S.F. 1638, 88th Leg.
(Minn. 2013); An Act in Relation to Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents in Animals, S.
201, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015–2016); A.B. 769, 236th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 233, 2013–14
Gen. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); Safe Foods and Families Act, S.B. 740 (Pa. 2015); H.B. 1195, 2013 Gen.
Assemb. (Pa. 2013); S.B. 531, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 2112, 2013 Leg. (W. Va.
2013).
N.Y. S. 201; Pa. S.B. 740; Minn. H.F. 1290; Md. S.B. 520.
S.B. 27, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015–2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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will not be permitted for growth promotion or feed efficiency, nor may they be
administered routinely for any purpose.160
Although the law allows for limited antibiotic use for disease prevention, the
legislative history of SB-27 suggests it will be enforced so as not to allow routine
disease prevention. The previous year, California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed
another bill that would have codified FDA voluntary guidelines, stating in his veto
message that he did so because the bill merely duplicated FDA guidance, leaving
open the disease prevention loophole and not going far enough to reduce antibiotic use.161 The fact that Governor Brown signed the 2015 bill into law indicates
that it is crafted deliberately to go beyond FDA voluntary guidelines and regulates
antibiotic use more strictly than does the federal scheme.
IV.

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND CURRENT ANTIBIOTICS
REGIMES

As discussed in Part II, democratic experimentalism offers a key theoretical
lens for regulating in the antibiotics context for several reasons. This approach
accounts for the scientific nature of antibiotic resistance and the problem’s critical
threat to public health. At the same time, it mandates structured, disciplined action
while still flexibly accounting for local circumstances. This Part situates the current antibiotics regime, consisting of a state law and somewhat nebulous federal
administrative agency action, within the democratic experimentalist framework,
delineating how democratic experimentalist theory applies (and does not apply)
to current antibiotics regulation and offering prescriptive suggestions for how the
theoretical framework should apply in this context going forward. It argues that a
new iteration of democratic experimentalism emerges, called layered democratic
experimentalism, which offers great promise as a hybrid public-private mechanism
for problem-solving. This Part concludes by describing challenges in applying
democratic experimentalism to this problem, related primarily to concerns about
equity and the lack of national uniformity.
A.

The Emergence of Layered Democratic Experimentalism

In its simplest terms, democratic experimentalism consists of (1) centralized
goal-setting; (2) delegation of experimentation to achieve that goal to subnational
160. Id.
161. Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal., to the Members of the Cal. State Senate

(Sept. 29, 2014), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_835_Veto_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/54URVZH5].
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jurisdictions; (3) centralized data collection on local performance; and (4) centralized assessment of local performance and revising of initial benchmarks as
necessary.162
The first step in democratic experimentalist inquiry is a central institution
identifying and expressly stating a common goal. In this case, centralized
goal-setting has surely occurred. At the federal level, the FDA has identified a
common goal in its voluntary Guidance for Industry documents: reducing antibiotic resistance in humans by reducing or eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use
in livestock.163 In addition to the FDA, the White House has issued the National
Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.164 One of the purposes
of this plan is to “guide action by public health, healthcare, and veterinary partners
in a common effort to address urgent and serious drug-resistant threats that affect
people in the U.S. and around the world.”165 In addition, the Action Plan announced that “[p]rogress towards achieving these outcomes will be monitored by
the U.S. Government Task Force that developed [the plan].”166 At the federal
level, then, both the FDA and the White House have articulated the common
goal of reducing antibiotic resistance in humans by reducing the subtherapeutic
use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.
The state of California has announced its desire to achieve this federal goal in
enacting SB-27.167 The law was passed for the express purpose of “address[ing]
an urgent public health problem” posed by overuse of antibiotics, and to reduce
antibiotic resistance in humans by reducing the use of antibiotics in livestock.168
Indeed, during the first Senate hearing on SB-27, Senator Hill, the bill’s author,
articulated the bill’s goal by alluding to the growing public health threat posed by
the overuse and misuse of agricultural antibiotics.169 In enacting this law, California has taken steps in pursuit of the federal government’s articulated goal,
162. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 54–55, 78–79; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 84, at 316–17.
163. FDA, supra note 123; FDA, supra note 120.
164. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

BACTERIA (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/national_action_plan_for
_combating_antibotic-resistant_bacteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y37G-RUM9].
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
S.B. 27, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015–2016) (codified as 4.5 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §
14400).
Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal., to the Members of the Cal. State Senate
(Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_27_Signing_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D5L7-A7UQ].
SENATOR HILL, HEARING REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,
LIVESTOCK: USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 21, 2015).
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resembling the beginnings of a democratic experimentalist relationship between
state and federal government.
The resemblance of SB-27 to traditionally conceived democratic experimentalism begins to break down at this point, in that there is not a federal delegation to
states to experiment locally in pursuit of achieving this goal. The California law
was not enacted in response to a federal delegation of authority; in fact, it may
even fly in the face of federal authority if it is found to be preempted. Despite the
fact that this regime is not a neat example of democratic experimentalism, however,
the theoretical framework does or can still apply, albeit in a more layered manner.
At first glance the California law may seem to resemble a traditional
command-and-control piece of legislation. It operates as a ban on a certain set
of practices. But it also has elements of democratic experimentalism and the
potential for a democratic experimentalist implementation. The law calls for
improved data collection in order to better understand the scientific problem at
hand and to monitor livestock management in implementation of this law, and it
plans to do both in continuous coordination with the relevant federal agencies
and departments.170 But the law leaves significant leeway in implementing its data
collection requirements.171 It is thus at a pivotal point: Its implementation is
both critical and up for determination. If the law is implemented in a traditional
command-and-control manner with little meaningful data collection, the
democratic experimentalist framework would have little application and thus
little effect as a theoretical framework. Alternatively, if the law is implemented
with strategic and robust data collection requirements, California will emerge as
a central coordinator, collecting and comparing data and possibly even serving
as a curator of best practices among California firms. This implementation
would underscore the law’s engagement in an implicit delegation of authority to
experiment to local firms. Perhaps even more compelling, if other states follow
suit with their own laws regulating antibiotics and mandating data collection, the
various states’ experiences and the effects of their different legislations could be
compared and best legislative practices discerned. This process would resemble a
true democratic experimentalist approach among participating states.
What would then emerge is a layered public-private democratic experimentalism in which the federal government identifies a goal, state governments
enact an initial benchmark and serve as data collectors and poolers, and local
firms receive delegated authority to experiment to achieve the overarching goal.
This approach does not represent traditional democratic experimentalism, but it
170. S.B. 27.
171. Id.

582

64 UCLA L. REV. 550 (2017)

is a powerful iteration. Experimentation in best practices at both the firm level
(how to efficiently raise livestock without the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics)
and the state level (which legislative practices result in the greatest reduction of
agricultural use of antibiotics) is where real change and meaningful breakthroughs
can occur.172
It may seem at first glance as though a ban is the only legislative option to
eliminate problematic antibiotic use and that therefore this policy issue is not ripe
for democratic experimentalism. It may also seem that a ban is a straightforward
piece of command-and-control legislation with no democratic experimentalist
characteristics. A brief example from the European Union illustrates why both of
these suppositions are incorrect. The European Union banned antibiotics as
growth promoters in 2006.173 Because all member states must comply with the
same blanket ban, the expectation is that the same or similar results would accrue
in each country. This was not the case. Some countries’ use of antibiotics has
increased since the ban, others have remained constant, and still others have
decreased. Since 2011, eleven European countries have decreased antibiotic use
in livestock while six have increased.174 In the Netherlands, for example, antibiotic use remained constant even as subtherapeutic use dropped, with producers
simply increasing their therapeutic use of antibiotics to compensate for the ban
on subtherapeutic use.175 In response to these unsatisfactory results from EUlevel regulation, in 2007 the Netherlands implemented its own supplementary
measures alongside the ban, including increased on-farm transparency; requiring
veterinary registration of prescribed antibiotics; creating an independent institute
to monitor antibiotic use, report it publicly, and set benchmarks; and requiring
custom treatment plans for each farm, among other measures.176 The Netherlands
implemented these measures in large part based on the successful Danish
172. Tom Philpott, How Factory Farms Play Chicken With Antibiotics, MOTHER JONES (May/June
173.
174.
175.
176.

2016) http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/05/perdue-antibiotic-free-chicken-meatresistance [https://perma.cc/ALM8-RM4M].
Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 on Additives for Use in Animal Nutrition, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 29.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AMR: A MAJOR EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CHALLENGE,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_food-safety/docs/amr_factsheet_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA3JE4WL].
Carol Cogliani et al., Restricting Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals: Lessons From Europe, 6
MICROBE 274, 277 (2011), http://emerald.tufts.edu/med/apua/research/pew_12_846139138.pdf.
Dik Mevius & Dick Heederik, Reduction of Antibiotic Use in Animals “Let’s Go Dutch”, 9 J.
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ & LEBENSMITTELICHERHEIT 177. 179 (2014), http://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00003-014-0874-z.
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approach.177 As a result of these measures, the Netherlands reduced antibiotic
use by 56 percent over five years, meeting its target reduction one year early.178
This example illustrates how the other practices that a state legislates alongside a
blanket ban can be critical and the importance of comparing to another entity’s
experience. Simply banning certain uses may not have the intended results and
can still leave room for critical experimentation and comparison, illustrating how
democratic experimentalism can provide a solution in this policy area.
Delegating this authority to states and even to firms, even implicitly as the
California law has done, represents a critical approach to problem-solving in this
area. If there is robust data collection in place to track experiences at the firm- and
state-levels, best practices can be identified and then enshrined legislatively, and
benchmarks set and re-set once met. This iterative process can continue until the
problem is solved. Data collection is therefore a crucial step for the success of
democratic experimentalism. Without robust data collection, experiences cannot
be assessed and compared and benchmarks cannot be met.
California’s success in this area could inspire other states to begin legislating around antibiotics as well, or at least mandating data collection.179 This trend
would come to resemble a bottom-up democratic experimentalist movement
amongst states. What started as a non-traditional layered democratic experimentalist approach would in fact come to represent a participant-involved democratic movement, supporting and reinforcing the basic ethos behind democratic
experimentalism. Layered democratic experimentalism thus offers great promise
as a hybrid public-private mechanism for effective problem-solving.
B.

Challenges in Applying Democratic Experimentalism

A lack of national uniformity is inherent in the democratic experimentalist
model: In order to experiment, there must be variation among subnational
jurisdictions. When considering whether to apply the democratic experimentalist
framework to a policy problem, the value of democratic experimentation must
always be weighed against the value of a single national regime. For companies
whose operations span across California and another state, the current antibiotics
regime will require compliance with two sets of laws. Operators in California also
177. Dik Mevius & Dick Heederi, Reduction of Antibiotic Use in Animals: “Let’s Go Dutch”, 9 J. für

Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, 177 (2014), http://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007%2Fs00003-014-0874-z.
178. Id at 180.
179. Over the last several years, concurrent with California’s legislative process, a handful of other states
have proposed legislation to address overuse of antibiotics in food-producing animals. Thus far
none of the proposals has passed. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 154.
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face the cost disadvantage of having to produce their products without the use of
subtherapeutic antibiotics while competing with producers in other states who will
still be able to administer antibiotics in this way. If other states follow suit with
their own antibiotics laws or use restrictions that vary from the federal government
and from California, a more complicated patchwork of compliance may develop.
In this case, then, the uniformity concern requires weighing the effects of
experimentation to solve a pressing and little understood threat to public health
and safety, against the cost to businesses and consumers of a non-uniform regime.
In order to conduct that balance, it is important to estimate as best as possible
the actual financial costs of eliminating the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in
livestock. Doing so also sheds light on another concern associated with eliminating the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics: the inequitable effects on the poor of
raising the price of meat. Evidence from Denmark, where the practice has been
banned for over a decade, suggests that the effect on the cost of raising pork has
been minimal.180 In addition, Perdue, a leading chicken producer in the United
States that has voluntarily begun phasing out the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics
in two-thirds of its chickens, has indicated that the cost of doing so has not been
significant, though it recoups the costs by passing them on to consumers in the
form of a 20 percent price premium.181 This passing on to consumers raises precisely the fears about inequity that may be associated with the ban on subtherapeutic antibiotics.
It is, however, important to remember the alternative. At present, an increasing number of companies and retailers are committing to eliminating the
use of antibiotics in their products.182 This trend leaves the poor with the unattractive option of consuming antibiotics-treated meat and increased exposure to
antibiotic-resistant pathogens in their meat, while wealthier consumers can
afford antibiotics-free meat and avoid exposure to these pathogens. In contrast,
if firms were required to experiment in the elimination of subtherapeutic antibiotics and centralized institutions pooled data on their performance, the best practices for efficiently and cost-effectively doing so would begin to emerge, ultimately
resulting in the least cost increases possible. In addition, the market price of meat
currently does not reflect the actual cost of meat because, among other reasons,
the current price does not account for the externality of breeding antibioticresistant pathogens in meat production. The current price of meat is the product
of a shortcut that the industry has been taking for decades—a shortcut that is no
180. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 74, at 3.
181. Philpott, supra note 172.
182. See e.g., Hackett, supra note 77; Strom, supra note 77.
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longer acceptable for public health. Legally eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use will require companies to innovate swiftly to produce meat costeffectively in a way that does not seriously threaten public health. If companies
choose to pass on any cost increases to consumers, rather than internalize the
costs themselves, it will result in consumers paying the actual cost of meat and
not an artificially deflated cost. It will also result in healthier meat and healthier
production systems for all—not just for the wealthy.
Finally, because many major retailers are requiring suppliers to phase out
the use of antibiotics in their production over the next decade, the writing is on
the wall for firms. Enacting a legal framework that calls for democratic experimentalism will best support these firms in achieving these goals by establishing a
collaborative, trial-and-error regime that rewards the most efficient problemsolvers. Doing so likely represents the most cost-effective mechanism for solving
this problem. Similarly, although it is unclear how costly it is to comply with
multiple sets of laws, it is likely that the streamlined and systematized schematic
that democratic experimentalism offers would optimize these costs of compliance.
Firms would certainly experience increased initial costs of compliance, but they
could also benefit from the experience of other firms, helping them to recoup
their initial costs. In addition, states would benefit from the legislative experiences
of other states, and best practices would emerge on how to legislate most effectively
to reduce antibiotic use.
V.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

State legislation prohibiting the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in farm
animal production is a strong potential strategy for reducing the spread of antibiotic resistance. States are not free to regulate in every area, however, and state
action in certain areas may be subject to constitutional challenge on preemption
grounds. Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts with a state law,
whether directly or indirectly, rendering the state law void.183 Federal preemption doctrine has its basis in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
which grants Congress the power to preempt state law when it legislates within
the powers afforded to it under the Constitution.184 As a result, where a state law
comes into conflict with a valid federal law, federal law prevails.185
183. See e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
184. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
185. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153.
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Because states are independent sovereigns in our federal system, courts
presume that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law.”186 A finding of
preemption is “not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that
the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that the
Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’”187 Fields traditionally occupied by the
states are especially shielded from preemption, as courts “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”188 In
particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has presumed that federal law does not
invalidate state laws pertaining to health and safety.189 This presumption is particularly important in the context of a state law regulating the use of antibiotic
drugs in food-producing animals for the purpose of protecting the health and
safety of its citizens.190 This Part begins with a brief analysis of preemption
doctrine as applied to SB-27, concluding that although a court should not find
the California law to be preempted, one could ultimately find either way on this
unsettled question of law. It then proceeds with an argument for democratic
experimentalist–informed preemption doctrine to apply in specific contexts such
as this one where the policy area at issue is knowledge-intensive and marked by
scientific uncertainty.
A.

Brief Overview of Preemption

1.

Express Preemption

There are two broad types of preemption: express and implied.191 Express
preemption occurs when Congress declares in the text of a statute its intent
to preempt state law.192 If the state law at issue is found to fall within the scope
of the statute’s preemption clause, the state law is preempted.193 In this case, the
relevant federal statute is the FDCA. Congress passed this Act in 1938, expanding
186. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
187. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) (quoting Chicago & Nw.

Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)).
188. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).
189. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
190. See A.B. 49, 2014–2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (“The spread of antibiotic-resistant

bacteria poses a risk to the health of Californians and reduced use of antibiotics for livestock
production is likely to reduce the risks of the rise and spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria through
food and other pathways, thus reducing the risk to Californians.”).
191. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
192. See, e.g., id.
193. See, e.g., id.

Contagion Without Relief

587

the federal government’s role in ensuring the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics,
and creating the FDA.194 The FDCA delegates to the FDA the statutory authority to “protect the public health by ensuring that . . . human and veterinary
drugs are safe and effective.”195 Of particular relevance, Congress gave the
FDA the authority to approve the use and labeling of any “new animal drug.”196
However, the statute does not contain express preemption language regarding
the regulation of antibiotic drugs in food-producing animals, so express preemption does not apply.197 In a recent case involving a question of federal preemption,
Association des Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California considered whether a California
statute banning force feeding to produce foie gras was expressly preempted by
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), the federal statute that regulates the distribution and sale of poultry products.198 PPIA contains a broadly sweeping
preemption clause that expressly prohibits states from imposing “[m]arking,
labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different
than” those required by PPIA.199 The court found that the statute was preempted
because it imposed ingredient requirements—namely, force feeding requirements—for the sale of foie gras in California that were not required by the federal
statute.200 Although the court interpreted the meaning of “ingredient requirement” broadly in that case to include force feeding birds to produce foie gras, the
same cannot be said for administering subtherapeutic antibiotics to animals.
Unlike force feeding birds, which creates the type of fatty liver requisite for
producing foie gras, administering subtherapeutic antibiotics to animals is not a
necessary ingredient for creating any specific type of food. Therefore SB-27
does not trigger the PPIA preemption provision and is distinguishable from
Association des Éleveurs.
194.
195.
196.
197.

21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012).
21 U.S.C. §§ 393(b)(2) (2012).
21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (2012).
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 538 (1977) (stating that the FDCA “contains no preemptive language”).
198. Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1139 (C.D.
Cal. 2015).
199. 21 U.S.C. § 467e (2012). The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) regulates the distribution and
sale of meat products. It contains a nearly identical preemption clause to PPIA. 21 U.S.C. § 678
(2012).
200. Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.
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Implied Preemption

In the absence of an express preemption clause, a court may still invalidate a
state law under implied preemption. Within implied preemption are two categories: field preemption and conflict preemption.
Field preemption only occurs where Congress has not expressly preempted
state law, but has legislated to create a federal regulatory scheme that is so pervasive as to “occupy the field” in that area of the law and warrant the inference that
Congress did not intend the states to supplement it.201 The Supreme Court has
reserved findings of field preemption for cases involving comprehensive federal
legal regimes, such as national labor law, where the intent of Congress was unmistakably to create a uniform national system.202 The relevant question is
whether the FDCA, in combination with the FDA antibiotics scheme, can be
considered a pervasive federal regulatory regime akin to national labor legislation.
After forty years of silent indecision vis-à-vis antibiotics in food-producing animals,
the FDA chose to pursue an informal voluntary route consisting of two voluntary
guidance documents and a final rule, in large part to avoid the complexity and cost
of the formal process. The FDA’s choice to avoid formal processes weighs
strongly against finding the existence of a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme occupying the entire field. In light of the current patchwork of voluntary
and piecemeal federal action, it seems implausible that a court could conclude
that a comprehensive federal regime exists to overcome the presumption for
states to legislate to protect public health and safety, such that the unequivocal
congressional intent was to prohibit supplementary state law regulating the dangerous overuse of antibiotics.203
201. Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
202. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959).
203. It is important to note that one district court case from 1986 has touched on the issue of field

preemption and antibiotics. In Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corporation,
a nonprofit organization brought an action to compel a veal company to disclose information on its
label regarding its production practices in raising veal. Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc. v.
Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 278 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986).
The court held that the claims were preempted by the “comprehensive federal scheme” in the
labeling, packaging, and marketing of meat and use of medicated animal feeds. Id. There are
several critical distinctions between Provimi and SB-27. Provimi was a deceptive practices action
primarily concerned with animal welfare and meat labeling. It attempted to compel corporate
speech and require a certain label be affixed to certain meat. In contrast, SB-27 is a state law
primarily concerned with protecting the health and safety of consumers from the dangerous
overuse of antibiotics, a danger bolstered by mounting scientific evidence. SB-27 does not compel
speech or concern labeling, packaging, or marketing meat. While Provimi implicated FDCA,
FMIA, and PPIA, prompting the court to find a comprehensive regulatory regime was in place,
SB-27 only implicates the FDCA and the FDA voluntary scheme regarding antibiotics. These
cannot reasonably be considered a comprehensive federal regulatory regime. The holding in
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Conflict preemption further breaks down into two types. The first type,
known as “physical impossibility,” occurs when it is impossible to comply with
both the federal and state statutes at once.204 Physical impossibility cases are relatively clear-cut. The Supreme Court interprets physical impossibility preemption
narrowly, reserving its application of the doctrine for cases where federal law and
state law are entirely irreconcilable—for instance, where “state law penalizes what
federal law requires.”205 Here, compliance with the state law prohibiting the subtherapeutic use of antibiotic drugs in food-producing animals would not make it
operationally impossible to comply with federal law. The FDCA provides a process for approving animal drugs and medicated feed, but it does not require the
use of any such drugs. In fact, complying with the California law will actually ensure that producers are in compliance with FDA’s voluntary guidance and are
furthering the FDA objective of judicious use of antibiotics.206 Physical impossibility conflict preemption thus does not apply.
The second type of conflict preemption, known as “obstacle,” occurs when
state law represents an obstacle to fully achieving the purposes or objectives of
Congress.207 Obstacle preemption is much less clear-cut than physical impossibility preemption; perhaps unsurprisingly, courts more easily invoke this type of
preemption than any of the others.208 With respect to obstacle preemption, “the
presumption against preemption of state laws dictates that a law must do ‘major
damage’ to clear and substantial federal interests before the Supremacy Clause
will demand that state law surrenders to federal regulation.”209 There is no doubt
that the California law is stricter than the FDA’s scheme. Indeed, Governor
Brown’s veto message suggests that it was the California law’s explicit intent to
go beyond the FDA’s guidelines. From an implied preemption perspective, the
relevant question is whether the California law impermissibly conflicts with—
indeed, does major damage to—the purposes and objectives of the FDCA such

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Provimi preempted a state law deceptive practices claim, whereas a similar finding in this case
would invalidate a state law, something courts do not do lightly. It is implausible that the reasoning
in Provimi could credibly be used to justify invalidating the California law under field preemption.
See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Fla. Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
See FDA, supra note 120, at 3; Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,708, 31,708 (June 3,
2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 514, 558).
Geier, 529 U.S. at 899 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 132 (William W. Buzbee
ed., 2009).
Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041, 1050 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hillman v.
Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013)).
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that the state law is preempted when it regulates antibiotics that have been
approved by the FDA and exceeds the FDA voluntary guidelines and VFD.
This analysis first requires assessing Congress’s purposes and objectives
under the FDCA. The creation of the FDCA expanded the federal role in drug
regulation, particularly by creating the FDA and delegating to the agency the
premarket drug approval process.210 Even as Congress amended the FDCA over
the years to enlarge the FDA’s powers, it “took care to preserve state law,” including adding a clause in 1962 “that a provision of state law would only be invalidated
upon a ‘direct and positive conflict’ with the FDCA.”211 Congress has added
several express preemption clauses to the FDCA, including regarding medical
device regulation,212 cosmetic labeling and packaging,213 and nutrition labeling
(via the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act).214 These express preemption
clauses suggest that when Congress has desired to preclude supplementary state
law on a subject governed by the FDCA, it has done so explicitly and via a
detailed, narrowly tailored express preemption provision.215 Though Congress
delegated authority to regulate antibiotics to the FDA, it has consistently and
explicitly disclaimed intent to impliedly preempt state law in this area.216 Case
law supports this proposition: When Congress has not spoken directly on the
preemption issue and a state has imposed a stricter standard that does not make
compliance with federal law impossible, courts generally assume that federal
regulations have set a floor over which states may impose further requirements.217
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the FDA’s premarket drug approval
process is insufficient to show that Congress viewed state laws imposing stricter
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009).
Id.; see also Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 793, 241 (1962).
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012).
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 379s (2012).
See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012)).
215. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (citing the FDCA’s express preemption provision
for medical devices as evidence that Congress did not intend to impliedly preempt state tort claims
involving prescription drugs); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The existence of an express pre-emption provision
tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute’s
express language defines.”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612–14 (1991) (holding
that plaintiff’s state law claim was not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act because the Act’s express preemption provision “would be pure surplusage if
Congress had intended to occupy the entire field of pesticide regulation”).
216. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567; Wis. Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 612–14; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547.
217. See Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 832 F. Supp. 2d 310, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 716
F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085,
1106 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Federal law is not a floor or a ceiling such [that] any state law varying
from what federal law permits is preempted.”).
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standards on FDA-approved drugs as an obstacle to its purposes and objectives
under the FDCA, especially in light of all the evidence that Congress did not
desire for the FDCA to impliedly preempt state law.218 The FDA’s approval of
the general use of a certain drug does not limit states’ abilities to restrict the drug’s
use in dangerous contexts, according to the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine.
The approval of an antibiotic drug for use in food-producing animals does not
equate to a requirement or even a desire that the antibiotic drug be allowed for use
in every context.219
The statute itself declares that its purpose is to ensure the safety and effectiveness of veterinary drugs.220 State law that intentionally exceeds the FDA
scheme could arguably be seen as an impermissible obstacle to these congressional
purposes. However, the FDA states in its response to commentary to the final
rule that VFD drugs should only be used for disease prevention purposes where
“appropriate for the treatment, control, or prevention of a specific disease,”221
which counsels against the use of routinized, low doses administered herd- or
flock-wide. The state regulation in this case seeks to achieve the same objective
as the federal government: the judicious use of antibiotics in food-producing
animals, particularly vis-à-vis routine use for disease prevention. The state is
stepping in here to fill a gap in the absence of binding federal action and in the
face of federal acknowledgment of the problem but political gridlock on how to
act. Far from thwarting congressional federal objectives, the California law arguably furthers them by limiting antibiotic use in a way that reflects over forty years of
FDA understanding and that is in line with the principle set forth in the VFD.
It is also unlikely that the FDA antibiotics scheme qualifies as an agency
action that can sufficiently preempt state law. “[A]n agency regulation with the
force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements,”222 but “[c]ourts with
good reason are wary of affording preemptive force to actions taken under more
informal circumstances.”223 There is some authority for the proposition that only
exercises of an agency’s formal rulemaking authority are sufficient to preempt
218. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575. It should also be noted that it is unlikely this type of state law runs the

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

risk of creating a patchwork of state laws. There simply are not many options for variation in the
laws around subtherapeutic antibiotic use. The California law uncontroversially reflects forty years
of FDA practice and understanding about subtherapeutic antibiotic use. It is likely any other state
legislating in this area would adopt a similar or identical approach. If not, that state would run the
risk of thwarting federal objectives.
See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 33 F. Supp. at 1106 (“Not banning some activity is not the same
as affirmatively requiring that it be allowed.”).
See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
Id.
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576.
Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
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state law.224 Although there are exceptions to requiring formal notice and comment rulemaking,225 nonbinding guidance is insufficient to preempt state law.226
Even if formal rulemaking is not a strict threshold to preemptive power, it is
unlikely that the FDA antibiotics scheme—two voluntary guidance documents
coupled with one final rule—would be given preemptive weight. Although the
FDA scheme should not be dismissed outright because it is not purely informal
and does implicate a final rule, the scheme is a sort of hybrid with murky contours.
Given the case law on point and the relatively high standard it sets for assigning
preemptive effect to agency action, it seems unlikely this scheme would be
considered sufficient to preempt state law.
On the other hand, the California law explicitly and deliberately exceeds the
federal scheme established by the FDA. Normative reasoning aside, in drafting
SB-27, the California legislature set out to exceed the federal scheme, as indicated
by Governor Jerry Brown in his veto of the previous bill that replicated the FDA
voluntary guidance. Intentionally exceeding the federal scheme could be viewed
by a court as presenting an obstacle to the federal purposes and objectives of
Congress. The FDA has considered this issue for over forty years, it has approved
the use of these antibiotic drugs in livestock, and it has decided to pursue a
voluntary scheme that does not prohibit the use of antibiotics for disease prevention purposes. Read this way, the California law stands in conflict with a
federal scheme, which, although unsatisfactory, is relatively clear in its allowance
of antibiotic drugs in livestock for these purposes.
In short, although the above preemption analysis suggests that the California
law should prevail if challenged, a court could plausibly decide either way on the
issue. A court could reasonably find that the law survives such a challenge because
224. See Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 51 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d and remanded, 555 U.S. 70

(2008) (“Unlike many other exercises of agency authority, formal rulemaking comes with a host of
procedural protections under the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), such as notice of the
proposed rule, an opportunity for interested parties to participate, a statement of the basis and
purpose of any rule adopted, and its publication in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 533 (2007).
Limiting the preemptive power of federal agencies to exercises of formal rulemaking authority,
then, ensures that the states will have enjoyed these protections before suffering the displacement of
their laws.”).
225. See Fellner, 539 F.3d at 244 (noting that “in appropriate circumstances, federal agency action taken
pursuant to statutorily granted authority short of formal, notice and comment rulemaking may also
have preemptive effect over state law” (citing Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 271 (3d Cir.
2008))).
226. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 340–41 (3rd Cir. 2009) (FDA’s informal policy
statements on the use of the word “natural,” as well as several warning letters in which the FDA
told a manufacturer to remove the term “natural” from a product’s label, did not give FDA’s policy
the weight of law necessary to preempt state law); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F.
Supp. 2d 1066, 1074–76 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (following Holk, 575 F.3d 329).
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it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported by California’s
compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Equally, a
court could find that the law does not survive a preemption challenge because it
deliberately exceeds the federal scheme established by the FDA after forty years
of consideration. This analysis highlights how the law in this area is unsettled;
states such as California that legislate beyond federal standards run the risk of
courts invalidating their legislation on preemption grounds. This risk of invalidation underscores the threat preemption poses to the valuable problem-solving
processes of experimentation and the fruits of data collection and pooling. The
only legislation in the country that currently meaningfully addresses this critical
issue is at risk of being invalidated: Preemption in this context could have deleterious effects on solving the antibiotic resistance crisis.
B.

Democratic Experimentalist-Informed Preemption Doctrine

Rather than limiting or threatening democratic experimentalism, in certain
contexts such as this one preemption doctrine should encourage its valuable
problem-solving processes. As Justices Brandeis and O’Connor have both noted,
“[o]ne of federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.’”227 Democratic experimentalist theory
contends that policy experimentation is central to optimal policy choices in certain areas.228 This theoretical framework can therefore help promote the virtues
of federalism, as conceived by Justices Brandeis and O’Connor, by informing
preemption doctrine and bolstering the argument against federal preemption in
these certain areas.
What, then, are these certain areas? They can be categorized as
“knowledge-intensive” and scientifically uncertain—where the impediment to
effective lawmaking is not ignorance of some but uncertainty of all, and significant
empirical data are needed to identify solutions. Expertise is insufficient to solve
problems whose solutions are uncertain and involve unsettled scientific or social
scientific questions. In these areas, amassing knowledge via experimentation, data
pooling, and multi-stage, continuous feedback policymaking is critical to
problem-solving.229 As a result, these policy areas are unlikely to be resolved by
227. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v.

Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
228. Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 557 (2015).
229. See Gubler, supra note 95, at 129–31.
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command-and-control legislation but are perfect candidates for democratic
experimentalist legislation. Knowledge-intensive and scientifically uncertain
issues may include, for example, antibiotic resistance, pollution, police abuse,
education, housing, and welfare.230 Where the issue at stake is a public good or
significantly threatens public health, as in the case of antibiotic resistance, the
argument is even stronger in favor of the democratic experimentalist approach
because of the acute need for efficient and swift solutions and the unlikelihood
that other forms of legislation or private actors will provide them rapidly enough
of their own accord.
Other areas that could raise preemption questions can be differentiated
from knowledge-intensive issues. For example, one policy area that might raise
preemption questions can be thought of as “values-based”: Society must make a
collective judgment about the types of values it wishes to promote and enshrine in
law. These policy areas might include gay marriage, civil rights, and abortion. In
these cases, allowing for experimentation at the local level would not yield any
relevant information in terms of how best to legislate to achieve a certain goal and
so democratic experimentalist-informed preemption doctrine would not apply.
No amount of data pooling or empirical testing will inform how best to legislate
in these areas; the legislation ultimately must reflect a collective societal value
judgment. If there are benefits to be gained from allowing differing local laws,
they are not experimental in nature. In knowledge-intensive policy areas, there is
an articulated goal to be reached—for example, reducing antibiotic resistance in
humans, alleviating police abuse, improving education—and the pathway to
achieving that goal is an unclear scientific or social scientific question. In valuesbased policy areas, there is a collective value judgment to be made and reflected in
law—for example, whether the state should recognize same-sex marriage, what
should be considered a protected class under the law, and whether abortion should
be permissible. Command-and-control legislation does not have the same
trouble in these contexts that it does in knowledge-intensive contexts. The
democratic experimentalist-informed preemption doctrine is thus narrow in
scope: It should afford deference to experimental approaches only in knowledgeintensive policy areas, as defined above, and not sweepingly. In these
knowledge-intensive areas, the democratic experimentalist theoretical framework
bolsters the argument against preemption. Preemption doctrine should evolve to
favor democratic experimentalism in these contexts.
Historical precedent exists for the potential of experimentalist state action to
effect largescale change to improve the food system and public health. Legislative
230. See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 91.

Contagion Without Relief

595

action in food law and policy at the state level has helped spur significant
change not only statewide, but also nationally as other states follow the first
state or municipality’s example. Examples of this phenomenon include the trans
fat ban, menu labeling requirements, states adopting nutrition standards, farm to
school laws, healthy food financing to incentivize locating grocery stores in certain areas, and cage-free egg laws.231 To demonstrate the effect state and local
action can have, take for example the trans fat ban experience. In 2006, New
York City’s Board of Health banned trans fat in restaurant food.232 Philadelphia
followed suit shortly after with its own ban,233 followed by Boston in 2008.234 Also
in 2008, California became the first state to ban trans fat in restaurants, effective
January 2010.235 Just five years later, in 2015, the FDA issued a final determination revoking “generally recognized as safe” (otherwise known as GRAS) status
for trans fat, finding that there is no safe amounts of trans fat that should be
consumed.236 By June 2018, all trans fat will be removed from prepared foods in
the United States.237 In less than ten years, the local and state actions in this area
led to a national ban, highlighting the impact this type of experimentalist state
action can have. It is critical to rethink how democratic experimentalist theory
should inform federal preemption doctrine in knowledge-intensive and scientifically uncertain contexts so that it encourages, rather than threatens, local experimentation structured by central coordination and monitoring, in order to solve
pressing policy problems—particularly those that involve threats to public health.
Bolstering state laws in this way will encourage more frequent engagement in
layered democratic experimentalist endeavors, with promising potential.
231. See, e.g., Act Relative to School Nutrition of 2010 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
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234.
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Mass. Gen. Laws); Farm to School Procurement Act of 2012 (as codified in ALA. CODE § 16-146 (2012) and as amended in ALA. CODE § 16-13B-2 (2012)); Healthy Food Retail Act of 2009
(as codified in LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:296); California Healthy Food Financing Initiative of 2011 (as
codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 104660–64 (West 2006)); Standards for
Confining Farm Animals/Prevention of Animal Cruelty Act (as codified in CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–94 (West 2010)).
See DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF
AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.08) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20070115114212/http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/pu
blic/notice-adoption-hc-art81-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVC8-U99B].
Phila., Pa., HEALTH CODE § 6-307 (2015).
See BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, A REGULATION TO RESTRICT FOODS CONTAINING
ARTIFICIAL TRANS FAT IN THE CITY OF BOSTON, http://www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/
regulations/Documents/Trans_Fat_Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/S46A-M929].
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114377 (2009).
Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,650 (June 17, 2015).
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Lessons for States

States are important agents of change in food and health law and policy,
often advancing the field where the federal government is cumbersome, slow, or
ineffective. The experience of the California antibiotics law provides lessons
for states, as well as other players in state and local policy, that wish to legislate
effectively to improve food systems and public health. As the deputy director of
the Antibiotic Resistance Action Center at George Washington University has
stated, “this is a very, very good bill.”238 This Part explores best practices for
states to consider when legislating to improve food systems, both in antibiotics
and beyond. This Part addresses both ex ante factors that should be considered
prior to embarking on drafting the law itself and engagement in a deliberative
writing process that maximizes the chances of the law being upheld if challenged.
1.

The Ex Ante Process and the Role of Popular Opinion and Scientific
Evidence

An important lesson from the California antibiotics law is the value of making
a deliberative policy choice when considering in which areas to legislate. One
way to avoid invalidation of a law is to avoid it being challenged at all. Selecting a
topic that is politically or popularly ripe is a key strategy to help avoid challenge.
In addition, to gain the bolstering effect that democratic experimentalism may or
should offer, legislatures should be sure to select policy areas that are appropriate
for this type of legislative approach. Selecting a policy area for which democratic
experimentalism can offer a helpful framework can strengthen the law by providing a sound theoretical basis for its purpose. Not only, then, can the democratic
experimentalist approach help provide improved substantive outcomes, it also
offers procedural promise in helping justify and uphold laws in certain wellsuited policy areas.
For example, in the policy issue at hand, the tide of public opinion is turning
against the use of antibiotics in meat and several large food companies have now
committed to phasing out the use of antibiotics in their products over the next
decade.239 This turn of events forces their suppliers to change their production
practices to meet the anticipated large demand from McDonald’s, Subway,
Panera, and numerous other companies. It may not be politically palatable for
238. Alex Zielinski, California Takes a Stand on Antibiotics in Livestock, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 4,

2015), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2015/11/04/3719085/ca-antibiotics-ban-influence [https:
//perma.cc/BS4U-THHU].
239. See, e.g., Hackett, supra note 77; Strom, supra note 77.
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meat producers to challenge the California law given that demand from companies
and from the public is turning against the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture.
The poultry and the beef industry groups in California have both stated that this
movement toward phasing out the use of antibiotics is inevitable and reflects the
trajectory of industry practice.240 As opposed to five years ago when the industry
denied that antibiotics were a problem, the political climate today has changed
significantly, and industry, including both livestock producers and restaurant
chains, acknowledge that they now “care about antimicrobial resistance.”241
To take another example, California recently passed two laws that require
that egg-laying hens “be confined only in ways that allow these animals to lie
down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely,” and that ban the
sale of eggs from hens not confined to those standards.242 The law was challenged for improperly burdening interstate commerce and under implied
preemption grounds.243 It was not industry that challenged the law, however; six
other states sued California.244 The case was dismissed for lack of standing.245 It
has been suggested that egg producers have not, and perhaps will not, challenge
the laws because of the potential “public relations debacle” that would ensue from
shedding light on industrial farming practices.246 The egg producers’ support of
a provision in the 2014 Farm Bill that would have phased out the use of close
confinement cages if passed suggests that industry players may have strategically
decided to concede this issue. The time for California’s legislation was therefore
ripe—even if the law does improperly burden interstate commerce or is
preempted, it is unlikely a court will ever rule on the merits of the case because
the implicated industry decided it was not in its best interest to challenge the law.
California’s timing for passing legislation on this issue was prescient and could
contribute to the law’s permanence despite its potential legal shortcomings.
The California antibiotics law also showcases the value of taking into account
the strength of the relevant federal regime and prior case law. The federal regime
is murky in the area of antibiotics, consisting of a federal statute and voluntary
agency guidelines. Furthermore, the minimal prior case law in this area involves
240. Zielinski, supra note 238.
241. Id.
242. Proposition 2, Standards for Confining Farm Animals (Cal. 2008), http://www.smartvoter.org/
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Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
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distinguishable fact patterns from two district court cases, including one case
from outside of California that was decided thirty years ago.247 The lack of clear
preemptive effect and compelling prior case law bolsters the California antibiotics
law. Lawmakers may be well served to attempt to replicate these circumstances
to the extent possible when selecting areas in which to legislate in the future.
The lesson from these two California legislative experiences relates to the ex
ante process of legislating, cautioning lawmakers to carefully vet and select issues
for legislation after considering the salience of the issue in the public arena and
the current state of public opinion, the potential democratic experimentalism can
offer as a legislative approach, the federal regime in place, and the strength of the
case law on point.
2.

Substantive Law Writing

The California law also shows the benefits of deliberative, calculated law
writing to maximize the chances of success if challenged. First, it is important to
identify and explicitly articulate compelling legislative objectives. Protecting
health and safety is among the most compelling state objectives; in these cases,
courts begin with the presumption that “state or local regulation of matters related
to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.”248 In contrast, laws that aim to protect animal welfare and even the environment are not
afforded the same deference.249 Lawmakers seeking to enact laws to protect health
and safety should therefore explicitly articulate this purpose and point to their basis
for concern, particularly where there is strong scientific evidence available, to help
boost the law’s chance of success. In addition, when states are also legislating
via democratic experimentalist processes, they should also link this legislative
approach with the compelling state objective in health and safety. Doing so can
serve to mutually reinforce both democratic experimentalism as a valuable state
process, and protecting public health and safety as a legitimate state aim. Linking
democratic experimentalism and the protection of health and safety can bolster
247. See Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 278 (D. Mass.

1986), aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v.
Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
248. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
249. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc., 626 F. Supp. at 280; Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at
1147; Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff’d, 615 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that city regulations relating to fuel economy
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Clean Air Act).
But see Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that prolonging
the lives of horses by banning horse slaughter is a legitimate state interest, and ultimately finding
that FMIA does not preempt).
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both as more and more states use these justifications to support their legislative
efforts.
Other law writing strategies that can maximize the chance of surviving a
challenge are to tailor legislation to prior case law and, relatedly, to avoid burdening interstate commerce. California legislators have done so in SB-27, for
example, by banning subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in the state while not
banning the sale of meat treated with subtherapeutic antibiotics. Making this
distinction in the law avoids burdening interstate commerce and implicating the
dormant commerce clause, helping maximize the law’s chances of survival given
the willingness of courts to invalidate laws that discriminate against out-of-state
producers.250 Making this distinction also indicates that California has taken
seriously the lessons from the courts in Association des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies
du Quebec v. Harris.251 By not banning the sale of meat—and thereby not conditioning the sale of meat on a certain process of production, broadly interpreted as
an ingredient requirement—California increases the chances that the law will not
run afoul of Association des Éleveurs and will not be found to trigger the express
preemption clauses under FMIA and PPIA.252 Because courts have found that
there is a comprehensive, preemptive federal regime regulating the sale of meat in
interstate commerce, California’s purposeful approach in legislating to make its
intent clear serves the state well in avoiding implicating that regime. By tailoring
its legislation to prior case law, California has set an example for other states that
wish to pursue a legislative solution to the problem of antibiotic resistance.
CONCLUSION
The use of antibiotics in food-producing animals in the United States poses
a serious threat to public health. For the past several decades, the livestock and
poultry industries have relied on administering routine, low doses of antibiotics to
food-producing animals as a cheap method of promoting faster growth and to
sustain their cramped and unsanitary system of production. The result has been
250. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing unreasonable burdens on

interstate commerce. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994)
(“Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se
invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous
scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest”); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959) (holding that an Illinois statute requiring the use of a
specific type of mudguard on trucks and trailers rather than customary straight mudguards placed
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce despite being a nondiscriminatory local safety
measure).
251. See Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; see also supra note 190.
252. See Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
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the rapid spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria among food-producing animals,
which is then transferred to humans through various environmental and foodborne
means. Because this system is thought to boost industrial agriculture’s profit
margin and because scientists lack data to bring transparency to the extent of the
threat these practices pose, the practices have been allowed to continue. For years,
the federal government has neglected to act while the negative impact of antibioticresistant bacteria has grown and now threatens to become an untenable public
health crisis. After years of impasse, California has become the first entity to
break through the political gridlock and enact meaningful legislation banning the
use of antibiotics in food-producing animals for both production and disease
prevention purposes. For the first time ever in the United States, a law will require
data collection on antibiotic use that will help equip scientists, policymakers, and
firms with the evidence they need to craft effective laws and practices to combat
human antibiotic resistance. The scientific uncertainty in how best to reduce
antibiotic use efficiently and effectively means this problem is not one for
traditional command-and-control legislation to solve. Instead, layered democratic
experimentalism offers a powerful framework for problem-solving in this context.
California’s law, if implemented strategically and robustly and using a layered
democratic experimentalist framework, has groundbreaking potential. Not only
might it significantly reduce dangerous antibiotic use in California, it could also
enable, for the first time in the United States, more accurate tracking of the
problem and data pooling on best local practices to solve it. This approach could
result in more effective and better-shared solutions. This new, layered iteration of
democratic experimentalism would harness the power of private firm innovation
within a system of centralized, coordinated data sharing facilitated by the state, all
under the umbrella of an articulated federal objective. Because California is a
large and influential state—and has the third largest livestock industry in the
country—the effect of this law and this theoretical framework for implementing
the law could extend beyond state borders, affecting meat production not only in
California but also nationally. If other states follow suit with their own legislation
and data collection, state experiences could be compared and best legislative practices would begin to emerge.
Despite a strong case against preemption, however, the California law is at
risk of invalidation on preemption grounds. Both because there is an overwhelming state interest in protecting public health in this area and because the
law does not impede federal objectives—and indeed, actually furthers them—it
should not be invalidated on preemption grounds if challenged. Even so, a court
could plausibly find either way on the matter. Democratic experimentalism,
however, provides a basis for rethinking federal preemption doctrine in this
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context, bolstering the argument against preemption. Preemption doctrine
should evolve to favor the democratic experimentalist approach in these contexts
where the problem at issue is knowledge-intensive and marked by scientific uncertainty, and particularly where there is a threat to public health.
The tide of public opinion in the United States is shifting against the routine
use of antibiotics in livestock. Several major companies have committed to
eliminating or reducing meat raised with antibiotics in their supply chains over
the next decade, but we cannot afford to solely rely on voluntary private action
from major food companies to address this serious threat to public health. Nor
can we afford to do so on the leisurely timetable of a decade or more that these
companies have set forth. If the federal government continues to refuse to act,
the fate of state action in this area is of critical concern. California’s law is an important first step in the right direction. It must be implemented effectively to
ensure optimal effect, and it must be joined by other states if we are to successfully
address this looming public health crisis. Legally requiring judicious use of
antibiotics in livestock across the United States and for meat entering the United
States is vital to protecting human health from the ongoing threat of antibioticresistant bacteria and to reducing antibiotic use worldwide. Applying a layered
democratic experimentalist framework and using that framework to bolster the
argument against preemption could have considerable effect on both the state of
human health in the decades to come as well as on the manner in which we
legislate to solve the pressing problems of our time.

